
JPRS-UPA-88-022 15 JUNE 1988



# JPRS Report

# **Soviet Union**

**Political Affairs** 



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### **Soviet Union**

### **Political Affairs**

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# Uzbek CC Scores Ideology-Related Shortcomings, Media Performance

18300210 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 20 Mar 88 pp 1-2

[UzTAG report: "Perestroyka Depends on an Ideology of Modernization"]

[Text] At a meeting on 16 March, the Uzbek Communist Party Central Committee discussed the key work to be done by the professional intelligentsia, scholars, and educators during the next stage of perestroyka, as the processes of democratization and fundamental economic reform move ahead.

R.N. Nishanov, Uzbek Communist Party central committee first secretary, addressed those attending the meeting.

The participants in the meeting noted that documents from the February (1988) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev's speech both have served to infuse the intellectual dimension of Soviet society with new vigor, put critical questions about the theory, history, and practice of socialism in the limelight, and make the task of dramatically improving the entire system of education and indoctrination a national priority. The CPSU central committee plenum also set out the key issues involved in the ideology of modernization. Thus, the individual person with all his concerns, problems, and activities should be the focus of all organizational, ideological, and indoctrinational efforts from this point on. After all, it is the professional competence of the individual that will fuel the acceleration of our economy and prevent a lapse in the forward motion of perestroyka.

Top priorities for us include making cadres more proficient and teaching them modern economic management techniques. Party organizations must focus on overcoming inertia in introducing genuinely economic management techniques, and an all-out effort must be made to make up the ground lost in the first two years of the Five-Year Plan. In addition, we need to use our considerable industrial, scientific, and technological resources to their greatest advantage, and increase the amount Uzbekistan contributes to the country's economy.

The Uzbekistan party organization—and indeed the party nationwide—appreciates the contribution the intelligentsia has made to implementing perestroyka, accelerating scientific and technological progress, creating a theoretical ideological interpretation of the modern world, developing social consciousness, and representing in artistic terms everything that is important to our Homeland.

One of the main lessons we have learned from the past is that if we categorically reject rigid bureaucratic techniques in managing the economy, we must reject them all the more emphatically in our intellectual life. The meeting stressed that radio and TV propaganda media, newspapers, magazines, and debates at institutes, artists' unions, and educational institutions are not very good at conveying how complex and new the problems being solved by the party and the people truly are. They often present superficial, inadequately considered assessments of events that have taken place in the distant-and in some cases recent-past. And sometimes, their interpretations of what certain individuals have done show a gross lack of restraint or due adherence to an approach based on class and historical context. In addition, signs of clannishness have appeared in artists' unions and among theater groups and journalists. And there is no shortage of individuals, including scholars, writers, and figures in the arts, for whom submitting to inertia is both a familiar experience and an easy one.

One of these problems is the way our science and culture impact both relations between nationalities and the task of inculcating internationalist sentiments in the younger generation. As with other problems involving peoples' relations with each other, problems between nationalities do not disappear by themselves. The ostentatious facade of internationalism that we have inherited through our previous tendency to imitate the policies of Harun al-Rashid is a distortion of Lenin's policy and has demonstrated that if we ignore the task of finding solutions to problems, the problems themselves begin to build up. It is time for everyone-from party personnel to scholars to cultural figures-to reject the outmoded view that indoctrination in internationalism and the state of relations between nationalities are not problem areas. It is a source of concern that large numbers of party and soviet cadres and figures in science and the arts have such a poor understanding of the social and demographic situation and are only superficially aware of what indoctrination in internationalist and patriotic values means. Certain people try to make it look like everything is just fine, ignoring the psychology of nationality and its very real effect on our republic, which is undergoing a difficult period of growth at this time. Some people, including responsible officials, are not forceful enough in their efforts to combat local parochialism, nationality-based ethnocentrism, and social parasitism, as well as occasional blatant nationalistic misbehavior.

When complex major problems like health care, environmental protection, and the preservation of historical and cultural monuments are waiting for sound, carefully considered solutions, it is unacceptable to offer simplistic, hysterically contrived nonsense. At times emotions and rumors have overwhelmed facts and reason and bred histrionics and other outbursts about the sword supposedly looming over Uzbekistan. At the same time, statements that the republic was slandered recently by newspaper and magazine articles with a negative focus are also irresponsible.

We feel it is our duty to halt the advance of those who are hoping to capitalize on the complex social and economic situation in Uzbekistan and use it as a vehicle for their ambitions and wild ideas about the narrow scope of a certain nationality. The participants in the meeting stated that nothing will ever force us to renounce our principles, socialist ideology, or the patriotic and internationalist traditions of our people.

There is no such thing as a pure nationality problem. Such problems are always tied up with economic, cadre, social, and moral issues. They include various kinds of clan-oriented aspirations and ambitions that stem from parasitic sentiments, ballyhooing about the superiority of a single nationality, and flirtations with religious prejudice. And they include attempts to whitewash the feudal patriarchal past, reconcile democratic and reactionary ideas, and present pre-socialist times in a more favorable light than socialist times. And these are but a few of the targets of the potentially alarming tide that threatens our internationalist underpinnings. This is where we must focus our organizational and political efforts.

In our indoctrination work, we are not always sufficiently attentive to the multi-nationality make-up of the republic's population, and frequently reduce our efforts to nothing but celebrations of various events.

It is extremely important to further promote bilingualism, ensuring that the people of our republic know both their native language and Russian, which is a critical medium of communication among nationalities. The Central Committee feels that it is unacceptable to accord any privilege or preference to one or another language of instruction in schools. If we reject the principle by which we give parents the right to decide which language their children are taught in and regulate this through some kind of bureaucracy, we will be violating the democratic rights of a nationality.

There is no doubt that we must teach love of one's native language and upgrade the way it is learned and taught. But it is also critically important that love of one's native language not turn into language chauvinism, which, unfortunately, is precisely what is taking place among some writers and university professors.

We cannot and will not accept those who make light of the part religion plays in fanning the fires of nationalistic prejudice and idealize the former patriarchal system and antiquated customs of the past. Any appearance of nationalism, nationality-based narrowmindedness or arrogance, or local parochialism must be seen as an encroachment on the fraternal friendship of peoples and the internationalist unity of our society.

The participants in the meeting also discussed the need for teaching people to use a class-oriented approach when looking at the past of the Uzbeks and other peoples of our country. One of our main priorities is teaching history in a way that preserves and develops our historical memory and creates the proper foundation for the people's historical consciousness. It is a positive sign that the people of our republic are showing an unprecedented interest in the past, desire to understand its origins, and upsurge of historical consciousness. It is also a positive sign that we are trying to fill in the blank spots in our history, stop the catering to historical vogues, and cease homogenizing the historical process.

At the same time, we need to be aware that debates about history have led to much that is erroneous, hasty, and sensationalistic. Facts, events, and individuals have been examined in a light that distorts them. The newspapers of the republic have launched a one-sided ecstatic torrent of articles purporting to interpret the literary heritage of Fitrat and Chulpon, who left us not only their scholarly and literary works and translations of Pushkin and Shakespeare, but their defense of pan-turkism and national narrowmindedness as well.

The participants also noted that the republic's Academy of Sciences and its departments involved in the humanities should take a more active stance toward perestroyka. The new phraseology being used so enthusiastically among some academics must in no way be allowed to mislead us about the great distance between research and actual life and problems or conceal the torrent of faceless monographs and dissertations. Nor should we ignore the lack of glasnost at some of our scholarly institutions or the fact that some managers are oriented toward mediocre, professionally insubstantial personnel and secret decision making. Social scientists have almost nothing to do with writing textbooks for primary and secondary schools or universities.

The mass media have a special part to play in developing the ideology of perestroyka. We should also note that the papers in the republic—although the central press was a little behind—have begun discussing problems in a more professional analytical fashion. To a certain extent, they have capitalized on the processes of glasnost and democratization and motivated workers to become more socially and politically active. Journalists have adopted a tone calling for more immediate action and espousing intolerance for shortcomings, and have begun dealing with more sensitive topics. The Uzbekistan Communist Party Central Committee has a genuine appreciation for the contribution our journalists have made to perestroyka.

But newspaper articles still contain numerous mistakes and inaccurate statements that puzzle many readers, leaving a bad taste in their mouths. This is evidence that our journalists are still not completely proficient.

Like during the first stages of perestroyka, our mass media have a tremendous obligation to be proficient; that is, to analyze events in depth and in a balanced way, share what is being learned from perestroyka and economic reform, think on a more comprehensive plane, and write in accordance with the party precepts—courageously, openly, and with integrity.

The Central Committee strongly subscribes to the policy that every effort needs to be made to develop the level of creativity in the artistic disciplines and prevent excessive simplification from setting in. However, the true value of an artistic creation comes from its integration of profound party ideals and the highest artistic sophistication.

Under our current glasnost, the party committees and artistic unions of the republic must occupy a precise ideological position, affirm party and socialist principles of intellectual activity, and expose and defrock petty materialism, anti-intellectualism, and any attempt to sneak untoward views and ideals on us.

The Central Committee buro recently took a no-holds-barred look at some abnormal occurrences in the Writers' Union and certain schools and scientific institutions. The desire of certain managerial personnel to be silent or avoid debate when the fundamental principles of our social structure are discussed and when the internationalist course charted by our party and government is called into question are incompatible with the statutory requirements of the CPSU.

At the present time, Uzbekistan's socio-political and socio-economic arenas, like those of the rest of the country, are seeing numerous positive—albeit frequently contradictory—changes. It has been a long time since conditions have put so many problems and such a variety of material in the hands of figures in literature and the arts. The party organization in our republic is in urgent need of figures in the arts who will leap into the events of our time, create works about the transformations underway, limn vivid models of those who are battling to implement perestroyka and accelerate the economy, and promote the development of a communist world view, internationalist sentiments, and friendship of peoples.

The participants in the meeting analyzed the state of affairs in the artists' unions of the republic from the party's highly demanding point of view.

The republic is still beleaguered by a host of problems in the area of providing the people, especially in rural areas, with cultural opportunities. And the party is relying on the intelligentsia to take an active and clearly defined part in solving these problems.

The state of affairs at the republic's universities is going to have to be radically changed in order to provide the appropriate ideological environment for perestroyka. The problems that have built up here are causing an imbalance in the availability of trained graduates with the qualifications needed by the economy, while the level of training is no longer in line with the needs of society.

However, this is not the only problem. The corruption, nepotism, patronage, squabbling, and nationalistic fervor that have been spreading at our universities are just cause for concern. At some schools, an authoritarian management style continues to dominate, along with a tendency to solve problems in secret, without public knowledge. The heads of the Tashkent Polytechnic Institute were criticized for this.

The main job of party committees implementing perestroyka in the area of culture, science, and education should be to develop maturity of world outlook and professional pride throughout the various strata of the intelligentsia, as well as to do everything possible to combat petty self-expression and unhealthy rivalry. At the same time, we must be more consistent in our efforts to institute standards of true democracy, encourage competition based on talent, and stimulate discussion of major artistic and real life problems.

Our existing shortcomings and unsolved problems are evidence that we must act decisively to ensure the total acceptance of perestroyka in the cultural arena and work steadily and unflaggingly to make sure the party and political efforts in this area are at the level prescribed by the February plenum of the CPSU Central Committee.

The following individuals addressed the meeting and expressed their enthusiastic approval of the decisions made by the February plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: A. Yakubov, chairman of the presidium of the board of the Uzbek SSR Writers' Union; L.N. Gryaznova, Uzbek SSR peoples' artist; P.K. Khabibullayev, president of the Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences; M. Kayumov, first secretary of Uzbek SSR board of the Union of Cinematographers; R.A. Safarov, editor of the newspaper PRAVDA VOSTOKA; S.P Tatur, editor of the magazine ZVEZDA VOSTOKA; K. Uteniyazov, pro-rector of the Nukusskiy State University; V.P. Gan, secretary of the Uzbek SSR Union of Artists; S.A. Varelas, secretary of the party organization of the Uzbek SSR Union of Composers; and A.T. Tokhtabayev, member of the city soviet of war and labor veterans. They stated that at this crucial stage in the revolutionary modernization of society, the intelligentsia of Uzbekistan would make a fitting contribution to the moral health of socialism and the creation of a social climate in which the inexhaustible intellectual potential of the Soviet people would be even more manifest.

The following members and candidate members of the Uzbek SSR Communist Party Central Committee buro took part in the meeting: T.A. Alimov; V.P. Anishchev; V.A. Antonov; P.V. Dogonkin; G.Kh. Kadyrov; V.N Lobko; M.Kh. Khalmukhamedov; Kh. Alimova; I.Kh. Dzhurabekov; B.F. Satin; A.P. Romanovskiy, deputy chairman of the presidium of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet; and I. Iskanderov and S.U. Sultanova, deputy chairmen of the Uzbek SSR Council of Ministers.

New Book Counters Foreign 'Lies,' 'Slander' Concerning Azerbaijan

18300244 Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian 7 May 88 p 3

[Azerinform report: "'Soviet Azerbaijan: Myths and Reality"]

[Text] This is the title of a book issued by the "Elm" Publishing House. In recent years there has been unprecedented interest abroad in Soviet Azerbaijan. The great majority of publications and pronouncements have been positive, reflecting reality in a sufficiently objective manner. At the same time, hostile propaganda efforts have become noticeably active and the anti-Azerbaijan speeches of our ideological adversaries have increased in intensity. Specialists on Azerbaijan work in such "specialized" institutions as the American Association for the Study of Soviet Nationalities, the Columbia University Center for Research on Soviet Nationality Problems, the special commission on Soviet nationality policy, the position of national minorities and methods by which they are "Sovietized," etc. Radio Liberty has, among others, an Azerbaijan desk, which engages in the fabrication and dissemination of unforgivable lies and slander against Soviet Azerbaijan. A total of 40 broadcast hours per day are received in the Azerbaijan SSR from abroad.

The growing volume of publications on Azerbaijan by Sovietologists as well as the practice of contemporary bourgeois scholarship on Azerbaijan require special generalizing works on this topic. The book "Soviet Azerbaijan: Myths and Reality" is a first step in this direction.

The aim of this book is to acquaint its readers with the multifaceted life of the working people of Soviet Azerbaijan and with the republic's successes, and to dispel the myths of the falsifiers concerning Soviet nationality policy, using as an example the achievements of one of the 15 union republics—the Azerbaijan SSR—which is developing as a member of the single family of fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union.

The team of authors has striven to systematize and to make a critical analysis of the conceptions, theses, and devices that are widespread in contemporary bourgeois scholarship on Azerbaijan, to define the role of this form of scholarship within the context of changes in the global political situation and the increased aggressiveness of anticommunism, to explain general tendencies and paths of the future evolution of scholarship on Azerbaijan, and to put new materials and factual data into circulation within the academic community.

This work offers a generalized elucidation of the historical path followed by Soviet Azerbaijan, the achievements of the republic in the economic field, in the social sphere, and in cultural development, and at the same time engages in a polemic with bourgeois authors, revealing the untenability of their myths concerning our republic.

This book is intended for academic workers, sociology instructors, propagandists and agitators, students, and also for the general reading public.

CPSU Policy on Ecological Questions Reviewed 18300228a Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian No 3, Mar 88 pp 71-85

[Article by N. Ye. Tikhonova, candidate of philosophical sciences: "Articles and Reports": "Current Problems of the CPSU Ecological Policy"]

[Text] Soviet society is currently at a turning point in its history. Restructuring of all public affairs has become the urgent imperative of our times. Responding to this epochal challenge, the Communist Party is attempting to resolve new and complex problems and is defining new approaches to various aspects of its work, including its ecological policy, the primary objective of which is optimization of the interaction between man and his natural environment.

In recent years the ecological problem has joined the ranks of the most acute global problems and has been transformed into an important area of competition between the two world systems.

The USSR has accumulated certain experience with regard to efficient utilization of natural resources and has done considerable environmental protection work. However, the ecological situation in our country remains quite difficult. For example, it is known that approximately 100,000 hectares of land are eroded each year. (1) Many biospheres, including such major ones as the Sea of Azov, are threatened with destruction. (2) Several thousand small rivers have disappeared over the past 40 years. (3) All these facts lend urgency to the task of evaluating in a comprehensive manner the party's past ecological policy and determining the reasons why that policy has not been sufficiently effective. Analysis of these questions acquires particular timeliness in view of the party's strategic course toward acclerated social and economic development of our country; this acceleration will bring with it substantial increases in the scale of society's economic activity.

Soviet scientists have already done some work in this area. Among the research work which examines the party's ecological policy to a greater or lesser extent we would especially like to note the studies done by E. V. Girusov, N. A. Gladkov, V. V. Zagladin, O. S. Kolbasov, I. T. Frolov, T. S. Khachaturov and others. A number of articles have been published on this topic. (4)

However, it should also be noted that study of this aspect of CPSU activity has only just begun. Therefore in this article we set ourselves the tasks of outlining only the most general contours in the evolution of the party's ecological policy since the foundation of the Soviet State, defining the reasons for its inadequate effectiveness, delineating new theoretical aspects of it and demonstrating the practical features of its implementation under conditions of accelerated social and economic development of society.

K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin considered the problems of protecting nature and using natural resources efficiently in conjunction with the fundamental questions of social progress. Creatively developing the ideas of Marx and Engels, who regarded harmonization of the relationship between man and nature as one of the conformances to law in the communist structure, Lenin pointed out the need to take environmental protection measures within the framework of the struggle for a socialist revolution even before the Great October Revolution," which was published in the spring of 1917. (5) After the Russian proletariat had won political power he defined the most important orientations of efforts to organize protection of our country's natural wealth.

It was Lenin who formulated the basic principles of the party's ecological policy. Among those principles were: consideration of the problems of environmental protection and efficient utilization of natural resources in combination with other aspects of the party's social and economic policy; analysis of matters pertaining to utilization of natural resources and environmental protection as an internally integrated set of issues; constant improvement of the judicial and organizational principles of socialist utilization of natural resources; a comprehensive approach to natural resources and utilization of them in the interest not only of the present but also of future generations; and unflagging attention to environmental protection issues and intolerance toward those who would plunder natural wealth.

Lenin's documents provide us with numerous models of a businesslike approach to environmental protection issues within the process of resolving major social and economic problems. Thus, Lenin pointed out, stressing the need to harmonize the interests of the economy and of environmental protection efforts, that "...if what is at issue is the harvesting of a forest, then we must ensure that proper forestry practices are employed. If the issue is petroleum extraction, we must foresee measures to combat flooding. Thus, in this respect we must observe scientific and technical rules and exploit resources in a rational manner." (6) In the Russian CP (Bolshevik) Program, adopted in 1919 at the 8th Party Congress, protection of soil, water, air, etc. is cited as the primary prerequisite for protection of public health. (7)

Among the many aspects of Vladimir Ilich's work to organize environmental protection and rational utilization of nature we should note his role in the establishment of the social, economic, judicial and organizational preconditions for systematic environmental protection work. The first and most basic such precondition, one which laid the foundation for planned environmental protection, was nationalization of the land, underground resources, forests, animals and plants; this nationalization was carried out in accordance with the decrees entitled "On Land" and "On Socialization of the Land."

The "Fundamental Law on Forests" (1918), the resolution entitled "On Hunting Seasons and the Right to Hunting Weapons" (1919), the decree "On Protection of Fish and Other Animals in the Artic Ocean and the White Sea" (1921), all of which were signed by Lenin, were of great significance with respect to environmental protection. (8) In January 1919 Lenin instructed that a draft decree on environmental protection be drawn up. (9) With his full participation decisions were made concerning the creation of our country's first state preserves—the Astrakhan and Ilmen preserves, and others. All told, Lenin signed approximately 100 documents concerning nature protection, creating the legislative basis for environmental protection and rational utilization of natural resources in the USSR. (10)

The party was guided by Leninist principles governing the utilization of nature at the end of the 1920's and the beginning of the 1930's. During this period individual measures to reduce the negative effect of developing industry on nature were implemented and resolutions were passed concerning protection of forests and organization of forestry (in 1928, 1929 and 1931) and concerning regulation of fishing and protection of fisheries (1935) (11); the rights and obligations of sanitary inspection organs with regard to the harmful effect of industrial enterprises on nature and human health were defined, and several dozen state preserves were established. To a certain extent this course continued to be followed in the initial postwar years: reforestation work was done in the RSFSR, attention was devoted to the problem of regulating usage of collective farm forests and to their preservation and restoration, protection of various types of natural resources was implemented, etc.

However, it should also be noted that during the 1930's and 1940's environmental protection problems were relegated to secondary importance in the work of the party and the Soviet State. This fact can be ascribed to a number of reasons. The specific conditions of our country's development during the first five-year plans, the grim war years and the difficult postwar period, times when there were keenly felt limitations on material resources, dictated the need to resolve various economic problems without taking properly into account the ecological effects of the decisions thus arrived at. Underestimation of environmental protection issues by the party leadership, economic administrators and ordinary citizens resulted in a general worsening of the ecological situation around the country, as did Stalin's voluntarist approach to a number of complex theoretical problems in the development of the biological sciences.

This situation began to change at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's. Rapid development of industry, greater use of agricultural chemicals and increasing urbanization had a marked effect on the ecological situation in a number of areas of the country. The need for environmental protection became particularly evident in the industrial regions of the Central Zone of the European portion of the Soviet Union, the

Ukraine and the Central and Southern Urals. However, we must not exaggerate the acuteness of the ecological problem during this period. The tremendous scale of our country made this problem considerably less acute. This scale also had an effect on shaping attitudes towards environmental protection as a problem of secondary importance, one which was worthy of attention but which was not yet particular cause for alarm.

Nevertheless, during those years environmental protection was declared to be one of the important tasks of work by the CSPU and the Soviet State and was included in the CPSU Program (12) adopted at the 22th Party Congress; the issue was subsequently considered at the 23rd-26th CPSU congresses. It was also reflected in the Soviet Constitution of 1977, Article 18 of which states: "In the interests of the present and of future generations the USSR is taking the requisite measures for the protection and scientifically based, rational utilization of the land and underground resources, water resources, flora and fauna, in order to preserve the purity of air and water, ensure renewal of natural wealth and improvement of man's environment." (13)

Environmental legislation was refined. As a development of environmental protections laws passed in the 1960's, during the 1970's and early 1980's the USSR and union republic Fundamental Land, Water and Forest Legislation, the USSR and union republic Fundamental Legislation on Underground Resources, laws on air quality protection and on the protection and utilization of animals were passed. In a number of resolutions by the CSPU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers specific measures designed to intensify environmental protection and improve utilization of natural resources were passed, as well as resolutions concerning protection of individual natural sites, for example concerning the prevention of pollution in the Baltic Sea, Black Sea, Sea of Azov and Volga and Ural rivers. (14)

Realizing that the matter of environmental protection requires not only the making of decisions, even the very best ones, but also intensive practical work, the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet Government have devoted a great deal of attention to improvement of the economic and organizational foundations of natural resource utilization. Since 1975 a special section devoted to practical measures to protect the atmosphere, our country's water, forests and land and individual natural sites has been included in the State Plan for the Development of the Economy of the USSR. With each new five-year plan has come an increase in state allocations for these purposes. During the 11th Five-Year Plan these allocations totalled 11 billion rubles, which was 100 million rubles more than during the 10th Five-Year Plan, and almost four billion rubles more than during the 9th Five-Year Plan. (15) Taking into account other sources of funding for nature protection, the total amount allocated to that purpose during the 11th Five-Year Plan was 43 billion rubles. (16)

In 1981 a special commission under the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers was established to ensure effective monitoring of implementation of party and government decisions relative to environmental protection and rational utilization of natural resources and to coordinate work by administrative organs and public organizations in those areas.

A variety of practical steps have been taken to optimize utilization of natural resources. A certain amount of work has been done in this direction by some party organizations at both the republic and oblast levels. Notable results have been achieved in the field of environmental protection in the Baltic republics, where environmental protection has been the subject of intense attention by the party for many years now, at all levels, from the republic party's Central Committee down to primary party organizations. (17) In Latvia, for example, for several decades now a comprehensive environmental protection program has been in place. Attesting to the effectiveness of that program are the telling facts that in the 1975-82 period alone the forested area of this small, industrially developed republic increased by over 150,000 hectares, and there was a substantial decrease in air pollution. The republic's Ecological Service, established at the end of the 1970's, is active, as is the republic State Inspectorate for Protection of the Atmosphere, established in 1983. (17a)

Considerable attention has been devoted to environmental protection problems by the party organizations of the Armenian and Georgian SSRs and of several other republics, as well as those of a number of krays and oblasts. Thus, taking action on the bad ecological situation which had arisen in the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk, the CPSU Central Committee passed a resolution entitled "On the Work of the Party, Soviet and Economic Organizations of the City of Ust-Kamenogorsk to Prevent Pollution of the Environment" (1978). (18) Carrying out this CPSU Central Committee resolution, the party organizations of Eastern Kazakhstan Oblast took steps to improve the situation. The state of environmental protection work in the oblast, as well as specific ways of improving that work, were discussed at an obkom party plenum. Party committee plenums with the same agenda were also held in Ust-Kamenogorsk and other cities in the oblast. In accordance with their decisions a considerable amount of work was done toward listing and standardizing measurements of sources of water and air pollution, and a series of measures aimed at making the cities, workers' settlements and villages of Eastern Kazakhstan more green and pleasant and restoring soil quality was carried out. In 1986 Ust-Kamenogorsk put large-capacity anti- pollution devices into operation at its non-ferrous metallurgical enterprises. (19) The oblast party organization has kept close watch over environmental protection work, making strict, partylike demands of those administrators who were too slow in restructuring their attitudes toward environmental protection measures. All these things have contributed to improvement in the city's ecological situation.

Interesting experience has also been accumulated by some rayon and primary party organizations. In Varnavinskiy Rayon (Gorkiy Oblast) the party raykom supported an initiative by workers in an environmental protection society to hold a public discussion on the most effective ways to improve environmental protection work in their rayon. As a result, in the summer of 1983 meetings of labor collectives at many industrial enterprises and village assemblies in hundreds of large and small villages were held in an atmosphere of great activism and keen interest. No one can help our forests and rivers better than we ourselves can — this thought, expressed at the assemblies and meetings, was reflected in the decisions taken by them concerning the assignment of rivers, lakes, ravines and forest preservation zones to specific brigades, farms, enterprises and organizations, concerning the development of nature protection measures and mandatory accounting on socialist competition among each of these projects, concerning how the measures are being carried out, concerning the beautification and greening of cities, large and small villages through public efforts, etc. This initiative has already yielded its first fruits, helping to improve the condition of some natural sites. (20)

The large amount of work done by the CPSU Central Committee and the government, by republic, oblast and local party and soviet organs, by nature protection organizations and the general public has helped bring about some improvement in the condition of the environment in our country as measured by certain indicators. Thus, over the past 10 years industrial production has increased by a factor of 1.5, yet there has been a 13 percent decrease in the release of pollutants into the atmosphere from stationary sources, as well as a onethird decline in release of polluted waste water. Widespread introduction of circulating or multiple-usage water systems has made it possible to lessen the need for fresh water for industrial use by approximately 240 cubic kilometers per year; this is equal to the annual flow of a river the size of the Volga. Over one million hectares of agricultural land have been put back into production through restoration of damaged land. Each year the USSR reforests approximately 2,000,000 hectares of land from which timber has been harvested. The network of preserves and other specially protected areas continues to develop. In the majority of our country's cities air quality has stabilized; the air has become substantially cleaner in Moscow, Leningrad, the capitals of union republics and in a number of other cities. (21)

However, despite the scale of the measures that have been taken the ecological problem remains as acute as ever. Among the reasons for this situation are reasons of both a foreign and a domestic nature.

In the first group is the fact that the natural environment of the Soviet Union is part of broader natural complexes undergoing progressive environmental degradation, the increasing presence of cross-border pollution from Western Europe, the arms race forced upon the Soviet Union by the most reactionary elements of imperialist states, etc.

Among the difficulties of a domestic nature are the inadequate development of a theory of social ecology, the absence of a required preliminary assessment of possible ecological effects when the use of modern scientific and technical advances is discussed, the lack of effective economic levers which would give economic administrators an interest in making efficient use of natural resources and introducing new, ecological technology into production, bureaucratic disarray with regard to environmental protection, the imperfection of systems of legal sanctions against those individuals guilty of polluting the environment, and the philistinism and criminal negligence of some officials. The stagnation of past decades has also had the effect of reducing the effectiveness of the ecological policy of the party and government. There has been a policy distortion in favor of technocratic approaches, undervaluation of the social realm (under which environmental protection has traditionally been categorized), economic dominance by the wastemaking mechanism, incentives to use more and more resources in the economic system without regard for true public demand, priority of narrow departmental interests over the public's interests, and deviation between words and actions. The lack of proper knowledge of and practical experience in this area on the part of some administrators, inertia in the thinking of many members of planning organs and ordinary citizens, their low level of ecological culture and their faith in the inexhaustibility of natural resources, the secondary importance of ecological considerations, etc. have all played a negative role. All these factors of an economic, legal, administrative or world-view nature have served as a kind of braking mechanism with regard to optimization of natural resource utilization and have sharply reduced the potential effect of the environmental protection measures undertaken by the party and the state.

As a result, of a total of 196 environmental protection goals set for the purpose of protecting the public health and for which provision has been made in party and government resolutions, only 47 have been achieved. (22) A number of environmental resolutions, for example "On Measures To Prevent Pollution of the Watersheds of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov" or "On Measures To Conserve and Use Rationally the Biospheres of the Lake Baikal Basin" have not been carried out, and pollution of these irreplaceable natural sites continues. State funds allocated for environmental protection have not only not been used in the best fashion, but have often remained unspent altogether. During the last two five-year periods alone 15 percent of such funds, approximately one billion rubles, went unused. The lowest level of utilization of funds among the various republics was found in the KaSSR, as well as in a number of krays and oblasts in the RSFSR; among ministries, the USSR Ministry of the Coal Industry had the lowest level. (23) There has been systematic nonfulfillment of state plans for the installation of waste water treatment facilities or anti-pollution devices for the removal of harmful substances from exhaust gases at enterprises under the USSR Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy, the USSR Ministry of the Chemical Industry, the USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production, and also on the part of a number of union republics. Outdated solutions have been included in plans for the costruction of new enterprises and the renovation of existing ones. Low-waste and no-waste technological processes have been put into use too slowly, and secondary resources are underutilized in production. Incorrect use of anti-pollution devices has caused tremendous harm, repeatedly resulting in massive episodic releases of harmful substances. Anti-erosion measures and restoration of damaged land are not being carried out at a rapid enough pace, and soil pollution has resulted from the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. Rivers continue to be clogged by wastes from log drives, and small rivers have dried up. Our country's land, water and forest resources have been reduced, and its animal life has suffered.

Along with these nationwide problems, problems of an ecological nature have also arisen in various local areas. The Aral Sea has become clogged with silt and is in danger of disappearing. The Kara-Bogaz-Gol Gulf is dying. In the UzSSR the long-time dominance of cotton monoculture and incorrect agricultural practices have led to a 40-50 percent loss of humus in the soil, to secondary salination and swamp formation, and to the transformation of 1.3 million hectares in the Amu-Darya Delta into desert. (24) The problem of desertification is also acute in the other Central Asian republic, where, as stressed in the June 1987 CPSU Central Committee resolution entitled "On the Unsatisfactory Utilization of the Natural and Economic Potential of the Agroindustrial Complex in the UzSSR, TaSSR and TuSSR," a careless attitude toward the introduction of scientifically based agricultural systems is deeply rooted among administrative cadres. (25)

In a number of regions the dumping of untreated waste water into economically important waterways continues. For example, enterprises in Krivoy Rog alone dump 150 million cubic meters of household waste water into the Dnepr Basin. Polluted water is being dumped on a large scale in Leningrad, Irkutsk, Arkhangelsk, Perm, Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk oblasts and in Krasnoyarskiy Kray in the RSFSR, in a number of oblasts in the UzSSR, et al. The level of pollution in some rivers, lakes and reservoirs remains high, and the quality of water in the Ob, Irtysh, Kama, Rioni and Don rivers has even worsened. (26)

The problem of air quality in the city of Kemerovo remains unresolved. As early as 1981 the Kemerovo CPSU Gorkom took up the matter of the unsatisfactory status of air pollution prevention at individual enterprises in the city and anti-pollution measures. The Buro of the Kemerovo CPSU Obkom adopted a lengthy

decision aimed at improving the ecological situation in the city of Kemerovo. However, the steps taken did not yield the expected return, and in January 1984 this matter was taken up by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo as a result of complaints received by the CPSU Central Committee. (27) A number of ministries were reprimanded for the lack of discipline shown by enterprises under their jurisdiction with regard to environmental protection measures and their need to eliminate shortcomings in this area was pointed out. However, despite the Central Committee Politburo's decision and the large amount of work which is being done in this area by the city's party organizations, which are putting a great deal of effort into the struggle against violators of technological discipline and into efforts to instill a conservationist attitude toward nature in workers, thus far there has been little noticeable progress on account of the extremely irresponsible attitude taken toward this problem by a number of ministries and departments.

A similar situation exists in Sverdlovsk, where the matter of inattention by the administrators of the Uralmash Association to environmental protection was considered more than 20 times by various Sverdlovsk authorities, including the party gorkom. (28)

As a result of this attitude by ministries and departments toward environmental protection issues, the air in a number of cities (Zaporozhe, Zhdanov, Novokuznetsk, Fergana, Yerevan, Krasnoyarsk, Norilsk, Omsk and others) contains a substantial quantity of harmful substances. In 104 cities around the country the concentration of pollutants exceeds established standards by factors of 10 or more; this has a palpable effect on the public's health. (29)

All this is tangible evidence of the operation of the braking mechanism in this area. The insufficient effectiveness of traditional forms and methods of realizing the party's ecological policy required that they be reevaluated and more integrally linked to the basic directions of the party's social and economic strategy and its ecological policy, combining them on a qualitatively new level.

Realization of this task requires elimination of the traditional stereotype in our approach to the problems of ecological policy; it signifies reconsideration of various measures which affect directly on the preservation of individual types of natural resources or natural sites.

There is now an objective need for a new approach to the problems of ecological policy, an approach which requirest that perception of rational use of natural resources as a separate problem, one which modifies both the means of stating the problem and the means of resolving other problems in the social, economic, political and spiritual development of society and requires that the braking mechanism now operating in this area be eliminated.

The basic features of such an approach to environmental protection at the present stage of our country's development were outlined by the 27th CPSU Congress.

That congress, which was held at a difficult period in the development of Soviet society and which reached a decision of truly historic significance, stressed the increasing significance of environmental protection and outlined measures toward making ecology more a part of public life as a strategic course toward resolution of ecological problems. Matters of ecological policy are now thoroughly interwoven into the fabric of all the basic

documents of our party forum, and the main objective of that policy — to harmonize interaction between man and nature — was proclaimed as a basic goal in the CPSU Program.

Ecological policy problems were considered at the congress with cognizance of the fact that in recent years the growth of production has been accompanied by a tangible reduction in the untapped reserve of "free use" — potential natural resources. Mankind is faced with the need to find an optimum alternative for achieving social objectives while also taking the availability of natural resources into consideration.

Saving money at the expense of environmental protection is in the final analysis fraught with serious consequences for society. Environmental damage, as measured in terms of a rising rate of illness, reduction of productivity of agricultural, water and forest areas, premature breakdown of equipment, etc. can, as experience has shown, amount to billions of rubles. However, the effectiveness of environmental protection measures is quite high if they are applied in a timely manner. Thus, calculations conducted in preparation for the 1986-1990 plan indicated that the economic effect from the installation of scrubber devices at USSR Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy enterprises alone would exceed two billion rubles, and that the economic effect of installing water treatment plants would exceed one billion rubles. (30)

The congress stressed that the primary untapped resource for successful resolution of ecological policy problems is active utilization of the achievements of the scientific and technical revolution, which has created fundamentally new opportunities to harmonize the interaction of society and nature. "Scientific and technical advances are being utilized with inexcusable slowness in the field of nature protection," it was noted at the congress. The latest no-waste and low-waste production technologies are being put into use too slowly; in mineral processing the overwhelming majority of the excavated mass becomes tailings which pollute the environment. (31) Thus, for example, in the mining industry, 90-95 percent of the material excavated is wasted, in agriculture approximately 90 percent of the natural substances used are wasted, in forestry this figure is 73-74 percent,

and so on. Furthermore, that portion of natural resources which is put into economic circulation is as a rule used only one time without subsequent reprocessing (32), although utilization of secondary raw materials is much cheaper than creation of capacities for the extraction of primary raw materials. In this respect we are lagging significantly behind not only the developed capitalist countries, but also behind many socialist countries. Stressing the inadmissibility of this situation, the 27th Party Congress stated in its new version of the CPSU Program that "scientific-technical progress should be oriented toward radical improvement in the utilization of natural resources, raw materials, other materials, fuel and energy at every stage, from the extraction and complex processing of a raw material to the production and utilization of finished products." (33)

The ecological aspect is present in virtually all the major economic measures which have been outlined by the party. Wherever we look, whether in the fields of power engineering, industry, agriculture or transportation, in all these areas of our country's economy we see that provision has been made for rapid development of ecologically cleaner types of production.

Development of the fuel and energy complex is oriented toward accelerated expansion of atomic energy and the natural gas industry, widespread use of non-traditional, renewable energy sources (34) and consistent work to conserve fuel and energy resources (35); in industry the orientation is toward comprehensive utilization of resources, widespread use of secondary resources and by-products in the economic system, a transition to less resource-intensive or no-waste technologies, development of production combinations which will ensure full and comprehensive use of natural resources, raw materials and other materials - thereby eliminating or substantially reducing harmful effects on the environment and the use of biotechnology. (36) Proposed in the field of agriculture is improvement in land use and increases in soil fertility, use of soil-conserving agricultural methods, expanded use of biological and agrotechnical means of combatting weeds, pests and plant diseases in addition to chemical means, a transition to less water-intensive irrigation technologies, improved storage of fertilizers and chemnicals and improved methods for applying them to the soil (37); in transportation, the emphasis will be on reducing transportation's negative environmental effects, specifically through expanded production of motor vehicles operating on compressed or liquified natural gas. (38) Special environmental protection measures are also planned with regard to plans for the placement of industrial facilities in cities. (39)

Thus, by considering economic and ecological problems in their interrelation, from the standpoint of long-range prospects for development, the 27th CPSU Congress demonstrated that the strategic goals facing the Soviet economy are basically compatible with environmental protection interests. These goals will require a transition from customary ways of protecting the environment

(construction of anti-pollution devices and imposition of certain limitations on economic activity), which have proven their ecological and economic ineffectiveness, to the creation of industry with closed cycles of production processes and maximum utilization of productionrelated and household by-products. One of the most important preconditions for the development of technologies which are integrally paired with natural resources is restructuring of production through the establishment of regional production complexes. These will permit the linkage of various types of production in such a way that the waste products of one type of enterprise could serve as raw material for others. The Timano-Pechora complex in the northeastern part of the European USSR, the Kansko-Achinskiy complex in Siberia, the South Tajik complex in Central Asia and others that have been established in recent years can serve as examples of this type of regional production complexes. Nevertheless, until recently their development was not sufficiently in harmony with the idea of comprehensive use.

Consistently guided by Marxist-Leninist principles of socialist utilization of nature, the congress stressed the importance of the environment not only as a source of material values, but also as a necessary component of efforts to preserve man's health and develop his personality. (40) This approach represents creative development under new conditions of the idea, formulated prior to the Second Party Program, concerning the need to preserve the health of working people.

The scientific-technical revolution has altered our view of the role of natural conditions in people's lives and has helped us reinterpret our concept of well-being. Today a certain level of environmental quality which will guarantee the health of the public is becoming to an ever greater extent on of the factors used to measure wellbeing. As data obtained in recent years indicate, there exists a direct connection between increases in the incidence of cancer, respiratory ailments and a number of other illnesses and the condition of the environment; environmental pollution has even given rise to new, "ecological" illnesses. The influence of environmental pollution on a human being's genetic structure and its negative effects on the health of future generations are cause for particular concern. A positive environment is of greater and greater significance with respect to the state of a person's mental health as well. However, calculations show that in the USSR the degree to which social and hygienic standards of environmental quality are being met is currently lower than the degree to which such traditional party policy goals for improving public health such as provision of food products, clothing, shoes, cultural and household goods, etc. are being achieved (41), despite the problems which exist in the latter areas.

Taking all these facts into account, at its 27th Congress the CPSU designated realization of planned environmental protection measures an important aspect of ensuring a qualitatively new level of public well-being and a factor in improving public health. This approach was further developed in a draft of the "Basic Directions for the Development of Public Health Care and Restructuring of Soviet Health Care During the 12th Five-Year Plan and in the Period up to the Year 2000." In that document considerable attention was devoted to problems of how to improve the ecological situation as an important aspect of preventive health care measures.

Party documents also stress the need for education about ecology, elimination of the mentality typified by a thoughtless, consumption- oriented attitude toward nature which is characteristic of many people, and inculcation in people of a sense of greater responsibility for the preservation and multiplication of natural riches and for their careful use. Aware that these qualities are acquired in childhood, the CPSU is attaching ever greater significance to ecological training for the next generation.

Taking into account the fact that labor collectives should make a major contribution with regard to such tasks as the maintenance and efficient utilization of anti-pollution devices, assistance with the introduction of nowaste and low-waste production technologies, beautification of recreational areas, greening of areas adjoining industrial enterprises, etc., the USSR Law on State Enterprises (Associations) provides for responsibility on the part of enterprises and labor collectives for efficient utilization of natural resources. The 18th Trade Union Congress devoted special attention to environmental protection efforts (42), as have congresses of other public organizations. Nature protection organizations and the Znaniye Society are now carrying out a wide range of propaganda activities to promote knowledge of ecology. Writers and dramatists have begun to bring up environmental issues more often, and motion pictures, radio, television and the press are beginning to devote greater attention to those issues. An atmosphere of greater interest in environmental protection issues is gradually being created in our country.

The time which has passed since the 27th CPSU Congress has been marked by major steps by the party and the state toward realization of the program approved at the congress for improvement of the ecological situation in our country. During this period approximately 10 billion rubles have been spent on environmental protection, including 2.6 billion rubles of state capital investment funds. Despite an increase in production volume, the amount of untreated waste water expelled has decreased by 800 million cubic meters since 1985. In industry almost three-quarters of all water used is now provided by water recycling and multiple-use systems. The volume of harmful substances released into the atmosphere has been reduced by 1.8 million metric tons. (43) Large new capacities of anti-pollution devices have been installed at ferrous metallurgical enterprises in Magnitogorsk, Chelyabinsk and Aktyubinsk, at nonferrous metallurgical enterprises in Krasnoyarsk and Almalyk, in the Barnaul chemical industry, as well as in a number of other sectors of the economy. There has been an increase in the number of anti-erosion measures taken in agriculture. A long-range state program for environmental protection and rational utilization of natural resources has been drawn up, with the practical result that ecological policy has been raised to a qualitatively new level. Environmental legislation continues to be improved. A number of party and state documents have outlined measures aimed at further rationalization of natural resource utilization. Thus, the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers have acknowledged the necessity of requiring associations, enterprises and organizations to make restitution for environmental damage caused by pollution, with the funds thus raised being paid into republic or local budgets to be used for the conducting of environmental protection measures. (44)

One shining example of the changing perception of the nature of and means of resolving the ecological problem are the measures being implemented in the course of restructuring of the economic mechanism. These are aimed at giving enterprises and associations an economic interest in using national resources efficiently and using low-waste and no-waste technical processes. The June 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum emphasized that environmental protection is a matter of "primary importance, requiring general attention and a tremendous amount of practical work." (45) Among the practical measures listed by the plenum were the introduction of payment for the use of natural resources, including land and water, application of social standards in the implementation of environmental protection measures, etc.

Under conditions of democratization of all aspects of Soviet society there has been a sharp increase in the role of the public in decision- making regarding environmental protection issues and rational utilization of natural resources; a search is underway for optimum ways of combining state and public initiatives in this area. Attesting to this in particular was the decision adopted by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo in April 1987 mandating broad public discussion of major ecological problems.

This resolution summarized many years of experience with all-union discussion in the press concerning environmental protection issues, the most important of which was the discussion concerning the fate of Siberian rivers, which culminated in August 1986 with the adoption by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers of a resolution entitled "On Cessation of Work to Divert a Portion of the Flow of Northern and Siberian Rivers" — the first resolution in which realization of a major economic project was halted on ecological grounds as the result of public pressure.

The story of the protection of the unique biosphere of Lake Baikal is also indicative in this regard. Since resolutions on the preservation of Lake Baikal adopted previously had not been carried out in their entirety, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers once again turned their attention to this matter. In April 1986 a CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution concerning preservation of Lake Baikal's natural riches was adopted; the public took part in the development of this resolution. The resolution outlined a series of organizational, scientific, economic and technical measures which would permit radical improvement in the ecological status of the Lake Baikal watershed and reorganize the operations of the Baikal Paper Combine. (46)

Other measures of an environmental nature outlined at meetings within the CPSU Central Committee also bespeak the greater attention being devoted to environmental protection by the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo: measures have been taken with regard to improvement of the environmental situation in the Lake Ladoga watershed (May 1987), in a number of our country's rayons and industrial centers (July 1987) and in other areas.

A comprehensive analysis of rational natural resource utilization was given in a January 1988 CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers resolution entitled "On Radical Restructuring of Environmental Protection in the USSR." (47) The passage of this resolution was the natural outcome of reevaluation of approaches to ecological problems in accordance with the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress. In this document it was noted that problems of environmental protection and resource utilization are still not being resolved in a comprehensive manner. Development of productive forces in various regions of the country is being carried out without proper regard for ecological impact and without a unified environmental protection policy. The CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have sharply criticized the situation in which environmental protection functions are scattered among various departments, scientific and technical advances are not fully utilized, and the "leftover" principle remains in effect with regard to allocation of resources for environmental protection problems. Also noted was the insufficient attention being given to these problems by party committees, primary party organizations and soviets of people's deputies.

Realizing the increasing importance of ecological problems, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers have outlined a series of measures aimed at radical restructuring of environmental protection efforts. In the process of developing the Basic Directions for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR, draft state plans and economic programs, plans have been made to link development of productive forces, acceleration of scientific-technical progress and environmental protection tasks. Comprehensive industrial and agricultural production based on low-waste technological processes should have development priority.

A union-republic USSR State Committee for Protection of Nature (USSR Goskompriroda) has been established for the purpose of improving environmental management systems and regulating utilization of natural resources. Its job is to monitor the condition of the environment, lend state ecological expertise during the compilation of general plans for the development of productive forces, draw up proposals on environmental protection matters, improve the economic mechanism of resource utilization, and perform a number of other tasks, including tasks within the framework of international cooperation. The State Committee and its local organs have a right to forbid the construction, renovation or expansion of various facilities or the use of natural resources if such activities are in violation of environmental legislation.

The resolution also provides for measures to increase the environmental activism of soviets of people's deputies, improve the economic mechanism for rational resource utilization in connection with the transition to cost-accounting, organize research work in this area, develop a system of ecological expertise on the production of industrial equipment, and bring about a sharp rise in ecological culture. Public proposals concerning the establishment of a USSR Society for the Protection of Nature and the preparation of a draft USSR Law on the Protection of Nature have been approved.

All this attests to the process of greater ecological awareness which has begun in the economic realm and is a good example of how the ecological problem is interwoven into the living fabric of our country's day-to-day life, creating in it new phenomena, changing existing ones, placing unaccustomed limitations on traditional types of activities and urgently demanding a new way of thinking which is attuned to present-day realities.

The ecological problem also has a very substantial effect on the CPSU's foreign policy activities. "We can see ever more clearly the need for effective international procedures and mechanisms which will ensure rational utilization of our planet's resources as a common possession of all mankind," the 27th CPSU Congress stressed. "One state alone or a group of states cannot solve global human problems by their own efforts. What is essential is cooperation on a worldwide scale and close, constructive interaction among a majority of countries." (48)

The Soviet Union is making a notable contribution toward resolution of environmental protection problems on an international scale. It is an active participant in the UN Environmental Program, in UNESCO international science projects in the "Man and the Biosphere" program, and in CEMA programs. Measures to protect individual natural sites such aas the Baltic Sea are being carried out under bi- and multilateral agreements. The Soviet Union has also been a direct participant in the

preparation of highly important international documents, among them the UN resolution entitled "On the Historic Responsibility of States To Preserve the Natural World for the Present and Future Generations" (1981) and others.

Taking a new approach to these matters, the USSR has recently come forward with a number of major international initiatives of an environmental nature which could help resolve the problem of ecological security, among them initiatives on: the development of a global strategy for environmental protection and rational utilization of natural resources within the framework of a special UN program; introduction of the principle of annual accounting by governments concerning their environmental protection efforts and their ecological initiatives (49); development of a single comprehensive environmental protection plan for the North by the countries in that region (50); and establishment of a system for monitoring the status of that region's environment.

However, the Soviet Union feels that a radical solution to the ecological problem will require the elimination of the threat of nuclear war and an end to the arms race which has been imposed by the most reaction imperialist circles. "The unacceptability and viciousness of wasting resources on armaments is becoming every more apparent as we face ecological danger..." (51) stressed M. S. Gorbachev in his speech to a meeting of representatives of parties and movements visiting our country to attend celebrations commemorating the 70th anniversary of the Great October Revolution. A decision to stop using tremendous amounts of natural wealth for military purposes would not only put an end to the senseless squandering of highly valuable resources and the environmental pollution caused by the testing of the latest types of weapons, but would also open up favorable opportunities for resolving all global problems, including the ecological problem. For socialism this course coincides both with its class interests as a system, and with its universal human interests. (52)

The interrelation between the struggle for peace and preservation of the environment was also reflected in the program of a public commission under the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace; the commission is headed by Sergey Zalygin and was established in June 1987. This new organization (it is tentatively called "Zelenyy mir" [Green World]) is envisioned as an integral combination of Soviet people's struggle for peace and the huge and ever-growing nature protection movement in the Soviet Union, initiating and reinforcing cooperation in this field with numerous foreign environmental defense organizations.

Socialism, with its planned production system and humanistic world view, is capable of bringing harmony to the relationship between society and nature. The CPSU and the Soviet Government regard realization of socialism's potential in this respect and the creation of living conditions worthy of human beings as their priority tasks for the present day. They have been guided by this in their practical work within our country and in the international arena, work in which the struggle to eliminate the ecological threat holds an ever larger place.

#### **FOOTNOTES**

- 1. See: KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1987, p 95.
- 2. See: PRAVDA, 22 January 1987.
- 3. See: KOMMUNIST, op. cit.
- 4. See: N. A. Gladkov, "Okhrana prirody v pervyye gody Sovetskoy vlasti" [Nature Protection During the Initial Years of the Soviet State], Moscow, 1972; E. V. Girusov, "Sistema 'obshchestvo- priroda" [The "Society-Nature" Systeml, Moscow, 1976; O. S. Kolbasov, "Ekologiya: politika - pravo. Pravovaya okhrana prirody v SSSR" Ecology: Policy and Law; Legal Protection of Nature in the USSR], Moscow, 1976; V. V. Zagladin and I. T. Frolov, "Globalnyye problemy sovremennosti: nauchnyy i sotsialnyy aspekty" [Present-Day Global Problems: Scientific and Social Aspects], Moscow, 1981; K. M. Sytnik and V. V. Voloshin, "Ekologo-ekonomicheskiye problem okhrany prirody" [Ecological and Economic Problems of Nature Protection], in KOMMUN-IST URKAINY, No 10, 1981; M. P. Mchedlov, "Ekologicheskiye problemy v teorii i politike KPSS" [Ecological Problems in CPSU Theory and Policy], in VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS, No 5, 1982; T. S. Khachaturov, "Ekonomika prirodopolzovaniya" [The Economics of Natural Resource Utilization], 2nd ed., Moscow, 1987.
- 5. See: V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 31, p 166.
- 6. Ibid., Vol 43, p 174.
- 7. See: "KPSS v resolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh syezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK" [The CPSU in the Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums], 9th ed., revised and appended, Vol 2, Moscow, 1983, p 92.
- 8. See: "Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti" [Decrees of the Soviet State], Vol 2, Moscow, 1959, pp 312-329; Vol 5, Moscow, 1971, p 245; "Sobraniye uzakoneniy i rasporyazheniy rabochego i krestyanskogo pravitelstva" [Collected Legislation and Directives of the Workers and Peasants Government], No 49, 1921, pp 351-352.
- 9. See: "Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Biograficheskaya khronika," Vol 6, Moscow, 1975, p 435.

- 10. See: "Ob okhrane okruzhayushchey sredy. Sbornik dokumentov partii i pravitelstva 1917-1985 gg." [On Environmental Protection: Anthology of Party and Government Documents, 1917-1985], 3rd ed., appended, Moscow, 1986, p 10.
- 11. Ibid., pp 47, 48 and 50-59.
- 12. See: "Programma Kommunisticheskoy Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [CPSU Program], Moscow, 1977, pp 79-80.
- 13. "Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoy Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik" [Constitutions (Basic Law) of the USSR], Moscow, 1977, p 11.
- 14. See: "O merakh po predotbrashcheniyu zagryazneniya basseynov rek Volgi i Urala neochishchennymi stochnymi vodami" [On Measures To Prevent Pollution of the Volga and Ural Watersheds With Untreated Waste Water"] (1972), in the book "Resheniya partii i pravitelstva po khozyaystvennym voprosam" [Party and Government Decisions on Economic Matters], Vol 9, Moscow, 1974, pp 17-21; "O merakh po predotvrashcheniyu zagryazneniya basseynov Chernogo i Azovskogo morey" [On Measures To Prevent the Pollution of the Watersheds of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov] (1976), ibid., Vol 11, Moscow, 1977, pp 119-122; "O merakh po usileniyu okhrany ot zagryazneniya basseyna Baltiyskogo morya" [On Measures To Intensify Protection of the Baltic Sea Watershed From Pollution], ibid., pp 388-394.
- 15. See: "SSSR v tsifrakh v 1985 godu" [USSR in Figures, 1985], Moscow, 1986, p 227.
- 16. Ibid., p 228.
- 17. See: A. Ron, "Ekonomicheskiye i sotsialnyye problemy okhrany okruzhayushchey sredy" [The Economic and Social Problem of Environmental Protection], in KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LITVY, No 10, 1980; O. Tamm and S. Etlin, "Sotsialnyye aspekty okhrany okruzhayushchey sredy" [The Social Aspects of Environmental Protection], in KOMMUNIST ESTONII, No 4, 1983
- 17a. See: PRAVDA, 12 November 1979; 30 August and 18 September 1983.
- 18. See: PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN, No 15, pp 3-5.
- 19. See: PRAVDA, 5 July 1987.
- 20. Ibid., 17 September 1983.
- 21. See: ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, No 23, 1986, pp 3 and 4.
- 22. See: PRAVDA, 13 April 1987.

- 23. Ibid., 5 June 1986.
- 24. Ibid., 5 June 1987.
- 25. Ibid., 20 June 1987.
- 26. Ibid., 5 June 1987.
- 27. Ibid., 21 January 1984.
- 28. Ibid., 14 November 1983.
- 29. Ibid., 5 June 1986; 13 April and 5 June 1987.
- 30. Ibid., 5 June 1986.
- 31. See: "Materialy XXVII syezda Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" [Documents of the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 50.
- 32. See: EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA, No 19, 1986, p 2.
- 33. "Programma Kommunisticheskaya partii Sovetskogo Soyuza. Novaya redaktsiya. Prinyata XXVII syezdom KPSS" [Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union: New Redaction, Adopted by the 27th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1986, p 27.
- 34. Non-traditional or renewable energy sources are usually considered to include solar, wind-produced, geothermal and tidal energy. These ecologically clean energy sources not only allow us to avoid pollution of the environment, but also to conserve a substantial amount of traditional types of fuel.
- 35. See: "Materialy XXVII syezda...", op. cit., pp 142, 147, 275 and 283.
- 36. Ibid., pp. 274, 279, 283 and 316.
- 37. Ibid., pp 144, 290 and 298-299.
- 38. Ibid., pp 298 and 306.
- 39. Ibid., pp 316-318.
- 40. Ibid., pp 155 and 261.
- 41. See: "Sotsialisticheskoye prirodopolzovaniye" [Socialist Utilization of Natural Resources], Moscow and Sofia, 1980, p 21.
- 42. See: PRAVDA, 25 February 1987
- 43. Ibid., 5 June 1987.
- 44. Ibid.

45. "Materialy Plenuma Tsentralnogo Komiteta KPSS, 25-26 iyunya 1987 goda" [Documents of a Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, 25-26 June 1987], Moscow, 1987, p 32.

46. See: PRAVDA, 16 May 1987.

47. Ibid., 17 January 1988.

48. "Materialy XXVII syezda...," op. cit., pp 18-19.

49. See: PRAVDA, 17 September 1987.

50. Ibid., 2 October 1987.

51. Ibid., 5 November 1987.

52. See: "Materialy XXVII syezda...," op. cit., pp 20, 74-75 and 178; PRAVDA, 19 August 1986; ibid., 5 November 1987.

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# Attempts to 'Rehabilitate' 19th-Century Russian 'Terrorists' Scored

18300198a Moscow VOPROSY ISTORII KPSS in Russian, No 2, Feb 88 pp 134-135

[Article by A.L. Andreyev, Doctor of Philosophy, S.S. Volk, Doctor of History, V.P. Naumov, Doctor of History, Professor, under rubric "Polemic Notes": "Clarity Must Be Introduced: On the Lack of Professionalism of Some Publications"]

[Text] It is completely natural that we are now turning once more to the glorious pages of our revolutionary history and recalling the heroic warriors who hastened the advent of the people's victory. When we think of the forerunners of the proletarian revolutionaries, we include the activists belonging to the revolutionary movements of the 1860s-1880s.

Historians, philosophers, and literary critics have devoted a great many works to the heritage of Chernyshevskiy and other great revolutionary democrats. Writers (Yu. Trifonov, Yu. Davydov) have also found inspiration in the heroic pages of revolutionary populism.

At the same time, our press and scientific literature have attempted to take a fresh look at the way the first Russian Marxists, and subsequently Lenin and the Bolshevik Party, evaluated the personal terorrism of the populists. Similar attempts occurred, in particular, in the 1960s, when after a long period — a quarter of a century — of neglect, the revolutionary populists were, so to speak, rehabilitated and again considered the forerunners of Russian social democracy. Given conditions during this period, the well-documented exaggeration of

the role played by Narodnaya Volya and the desire to defend and, to some extent, even to justify its battle tactics, are understandable. However, it is rather strange that relatively recent publications have also attempted to justify, to a greater or lesser extent, the terrorism of the Narodnaya Volya faction. This kind of apologistic evaluation appeared in the pages of the collection "Liberation Movements in Russia" (Interuniversity Scientific Collections, Issue 10, Saratov, 1981). Similarly, V.A. Pechenev, in his book "The Socialist Ideal and Actual Socialism" (Moscow, 1984), uncritically accepts the assessments in the memoirs of those who themselves were members of the Narodnaya Volya and evaluates personal terrorism positively. Selectively using Lenin's dicta concerning the contributions of Narodnaya Volya, V.A. Pechenev discusses the significance of personal terror by its adherents in a very one-sided manner, considering this tactic to be both morally justified and inevitable. In spite of the historical facts, he asserts that terrorist struggle was the stimulus for the people's revolution and that the adherents of Narodnaya Volya themselves were the first contingent of "Russia's mass revolutionary movement" (pp. 76, 83).

This approach has come in for its share of criticism from the experts and it might not have been worthwhile to raise this issue in the pages of a scientific journal, were it not for the fact that, recently, unsupported idealization of the Narodnaya Volya movement and the tactics used by its adherents have occasionally given rise to a measure of social resonance. As a result, the ground has been prepared for "warping" the propaganda concerning our historical and spiritual heritage.

A case in point is the article by Ye. Losoto "Forerunners," published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.(1) This article is almost completely devoted to representatives of the "second wave" of the liberation movement — the raznochintsy revolutionaries and particularly the members of Narodnaya Volya.

First, let us state that the sincerity of the author's enthusiasm for propaganda concerning the revolutionary traditions of the Russian liberation movement is appealing.

However, the "center of gravity" of the article lies elsewhere. Ye. Losoto attempts to prove that "the members of Narodnaya Volya had no choice, that they had no other recourse" but the road of personal terrorism and attempts to assassinate the tsar. In the opinion of the author of the essay, these methods of struggle cannot be repudiated as unworthy.

We must strongly disagree with these formulations. In the first place, the most prominaent representatives of the "second wave" — N.G. Chernyshevskiy and N.A. Dobrolyubov, M.Ye. Saltykov-Shchedrin and D.I. Pisarev — did not advocate personal terrorism. In the second place, at the very moment that the Narodnaya Volya

movement arose, G.V. Plekhanov very decisively repudiated the terrorist road, warning its adherents that instead of Aleksandr with two sticks, they would simply get Aleksandr with three (Aleksandr III). Plekhanov was supported at that time by V. Zasulich, whom the adherents of Narodnaya Volya were counting on heavily after all she had been the one who had shot at Trepov, the governor of Petersburg, the year before. Nor was terrorism accepted by the entire populist organization "The Black Partition." It is also not true that Narodnaya Volva did not have a choice of tactics. The central faction within Narodnaya Volya did not agree with the idea of all-encompassing terrorism proposed by the famous revolutionary N.A. Morozov and tried to unite various strata of the population dissatisfied with tsarism — workers, officers, students, etc. — on the common ground of political struggle.

Judging by available documents, the members of Narodnava Volya themselves were not unanimous in their understanding of the tactic of terrorism that they had chosen. Among the justifications given for this tactic were defense of the revolutionary organization from persecution by the authorities, revenge for the execution of comrades, the need to terrorize or disorganize the government in order to obtain a consitution or other concessions, and, finally, that it would give rise to a revolutionary explosion among the people. The presence of such a variety of goals in itself implies the possibility of choosing among various means of attaining them. This is why a constitutional monarchy would have been acceptable not only the liberals, as Ye. Losoto asserts, but to the majority of the members of Narodnaya Volya, as attested by their letter to the new tsar after 1 March 1881. The successful assassination of Aleksandr II turned out to be a Pyrrhic victory. Narodnaya Volya was routed. It had "delivered a mortal blow" to itself. (2)

One cannot ignore the quotations Ye. Losoto uses to demonstrate the inevitability and necessity of terrorism.

Losoto interprets Lenin's words to the effect that bombs are an essential component of the people's arsenal and his statement concerning terrorism against the enemy during military operations as a justification for personal terrorism. She misses the irony in Lenin's words concerning the revolutionary terrorist loners who have "made" history.

Without a doubt, the members of Narodnaya Volya are in many respects our forerunners. We are aware of their high ideals of love for the people and freedom, and of self-sacrifice in the struggle. But respect for their memory emphatically does not mean approval for their tactics and methods of struggle, which, in the final analysis, resulted from subjectivism in the understanding of the historical process.

Ideological precision and adherence to principles, which are so characteristic of Lenin's attitude to past heritage, are essential. Lenin acknowledged the historical contributions of the members of Narodnaya Volya and the enormous role they played in our history. But he categorically repudiated their tactic of terrorism. In his works, Lenin repeats more than once that terrorism of the "old type" took energy away from organizational work and detracted from the people's enthusiasm for political activism.

Consistent with these opinions, Lenin, speaking out against the Socialist Revolutionaries who resurrected the tactics of Narodnaya Volya and noted that the SR's terrorism was nothing other than "single combat, which has been totally repudiated by historical experience."(3) Lenin warned the members of the Iskra revolutionary organization against vacillation in favor of terrorism,(4) against the pernicious old errors, including the tactic of personal terrorism. "We must block the success of the attempt to restore the principles of Narodnaya Volya and to repeat all their theoretical and practical mistakes, as the Social Revolutionaries have done and which they are carrying farther and farther,"(5) he declared. "The history of the Russian revolutionary movement has clearly demonstrated" (6) that terrorism is not a fit tactic.

To Lenin the issue of terrorism was not merely a matter of whether a given tactic was more or less successful, as Ye. Losoto asserts. Lesoto's interpretation of Lenin's words on this topic contains a serious theoretical error. She essentially overlooks the critical fact that Lenin clearly distinguished the military actions revolutionaries undertake "together with the people" (7), (for example, the partisan actions of the workers' detachments) from acts of personal terrorism, as a battle technique specific to the intelligentsia. (8) The Bolsheviks had not renounced terrorism only to return to it as soon as an opportune occasion arose. Their repudiation was a matter of principle and was based on the idea that historical initiative belongs to the masses and the resulting tactic of mass political actions, which became the motivating force of the revolutionary process.

Ye. Losoto has missed these critical points. She even engages in a polemic with readers who have felt her previous articles contained an uncritical treatment and even a justification of Narodnaya Volya's terrorism. Indeed, not all readers properly understood the crux of the matter. But here, for example, is what B. Golubev from Kemerovo wrote in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA about the members of Narodnaya Volya: "Lenin loved and thought highly of all of them, but he always disapproved of their suicidal tactic of personal terrorism as unwise and just plain useless. Even when the tsar sentenced his brother to death, he said, "We are taking a different road." (9) Although this statement is somewhat categorical, it is basically true. But instead of thanking the reader for his cogent clarification, Ye. Losoto treats this letter as an example of an especially superficial understanding of historical phenomena. We cannot agree. Especially as the reader is essentially correct.

#### **FOOTNOTES**

- 1. Cf. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. 6 October 1987. Appeared in JPRS serial SOVIET UNION: POLITICAL AFFAIRS, JPRS-UPA-88-003, dated 25 January 1988, on pages 47-51.
- 2. Plekhanov G.V. Works. Vol. 13. Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, p. 27.
- 3. Lenin V.I., Complete Works, vol. 6, p. 375.
- 4. Ibid, vol 9, p 276.
- 5. Ibid., vol. 7, p 57.
- 6. Ibid., vol. 6, p 380.
- 7. Ibid., vol. 11, p 268.
- 8. Ibid., vol. 9, p 130.
- 9. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 6 October 1987.

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# Journalist Queries Colleagues on Authorship of Brezhnev's Works

18300253 Moscow ZHURNALIST in Russian No 4, Apr 88 p 7

[Letter signed by V. Bezuglyy, war and labor veteran, member of the USSR Union of Journalists, in the "Letters to ZHURNALIST" column, under the title "He Has Decided To Ask His Colleagues"]

#### [Text] Esteemed Editors:

Soon after the publication of L. I. Brezhnev's books "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" and "Tselina," there arose among journalists (and, indeed, not just among journalists) persistent talk of these books having been ghostwritten. In other words, talk that these vivid journalistic works were written not by Leonid Ilich Brezhnev, but by talented journalists. Nevertheless, the Lenin Prize Committee awarded the prize to L. I. Brezhnev himself.

The media did a great deal to ensure that the trilogy was presented to a wide audience as a model of party journalism. In my view, this was sufficiently warranted, for the quality of the writing therein is really good.

Now the time has come when it is not only desirable, but also simply necessary, to know the truth. Therefore, I considered it possible to address a letter via our journal to my colleagues who were the real authors of "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" and "Tselina," in the hope that they will respond just as openly to the questions which surely trouble more people than just me. Here is what I've written:

#### **Esteemed Colleagues:**

I have once again reread "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" and "Tselina." How are these books to be perceived now?

First, let's take "Malaya Zemlya." I am sure that it was written by a man who saw battle himself. Could the author have written the book without heart and soul? Of course not! Besides, the book wasn't about L. I. Brezhnev, but about the valor and courage of Soviet troops, who hung on by their teeth to little bits of land, where a fiery hell raged day and night. Yes, this was a minor event in the Great Patriotic War. But after all, didn't all the battles consist of such minor and major deadly encounters? And Colonel L. I. Brezhnev himself held a different post at that time—military commissar...

Now, about "Tselina." I can conjecture that it was written by a contemporary of mine who knows this subject very well. In its spirit, the opening up of the new lands was something akin to the courage of the people of Malaya Zemlya. They called their work the struggle for bread, for a huge addition to the all-Russian loaf. And what was L. I. Brezhnev at the time? Commissar of the Virgin Lands.

I also want to say a few good things about the author of "Vozrozhdeniye." Surely he saw all the postwar hardship with his very own eyes and couldn't possibly put pen to paper apathetically, describing destroyed cities and villages, soldiers still weary from battle, and our women full of endurance.

All together we raised up that which had been leveled, melding brick and iron to form hydroelectric stations and factories, to lay roads, to build homes and cabins...

I don't know whether the authors came to some understanding among themselves or were guided by some unifying directive, but the theme of the leading role of the party and the heroism of the common man was developed in the three books with insight and talent.

I want to ask you:

- 1. How did they "match" you to the task? What materials did you make use of?
- 2. What personal role was taken directly by L. I. Brezhnev in the writing of the books?
- 3. How was your work encouraged morally and materially?

And now I shall pose questions to this journal's readers, and also to the members of the Lenin Prize Committee:

If L. I. Brezhnev had a personal role in writing the works under discussion here, then wouldn't it be fair to share the honor given him of becoming a Lenin Prize laureate with his coauthors who are still living among us?

If L. I. Brezhnev did not take part in the writing of these books, then wouldn't it be fair to go back and review the artistic, journalistic and social merits of "Malaya Zemlya," "Vozrozhdeniye" and "Tselina," and in so doing reveal the true names of the authors of these books?

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#### Vayno Writes on Centennial of Estonian Revolutionary Hero

18000268 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Mar 88 p 6

[Article by K.Vayno, first secretary, ESSR Communist Party Central Committee: "Burning Heart: V.E.Kingisepp's Centennial".]

[Text] Every nation's history has individuals whose forward vision, high-minded ideas and revolutionary deeds serve as the guiding light to the succeeding generations. Viktor Kingisepp (1888-1922) was, and remains in the people's memory, such an individual.

There are some unique photographs: Viktor Kingisepp conducts a re-enactment at the site of the assassination attempt on Vladimir Ilich Lenin. Everything is set up just as the witnesses have described, just as it happened two days earlier, on August 30, 1918. In the courtyard of the Mikhelson plant two workers pose as Ilich and worker M.Popova, who unintentionally delayed him by asking him a question on the way to the car. During the re-enactment Kingisepp himself stands at the car's fender, at the spot from which Kaplan fired.

One can imagine what he was feeling inside. The right wing of the SR had just stabbed the revolution in the back. As it turned out, they had rubbed into the bullets the deadly poison curare, which, luckily, lost its terrible properties when the shots were fired. Workers miraculously saved the fanatical woman from the people's justice. Kingisepp's heart was burning with wrath. Yet, as the investigator for the All-Russian Central Executive Committee's Supreme Tribunal, he had to keep a cool head.

Guided exclusively by the principles of revolutionary justice, Viktor Kingisepp questioned Kaplan and confronted her with her fellow conspirators. Having carefully weighed the evidence, he removed all suspicion from M.Popova, whom some hotheads wanted to accuse of being in league with the terrorists. Moreover, he requested that she be considered a victim in the assassination attempt and be treated at government expense.

The Kaplan investigation was only an episode in V.Kingisepp's long and diverse activity in the VChK. But even that was only a part of his revolutionary career. At the 4th Extraordinary All-Russian Soviet Congress he was elected to the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and became a representative of the working people of Estonia at the Soviet parliament. In the spring of 1918 he was appointed a commissar to the commission drawing up Red Army military districts. He also carried out tasks for the Sovnarkom, for the Nationalities and Foreign Affairs Narkomats. He worked side by side with Sverdlov, Dzerzhinskiy, Bonch-Bruyevich, Krilenko and Stuchka.

Let us not forget that V.Kingisepp was only 30 years of age at the time. But on the other hand, for fully 12 of those years he had been a member of the communist party. While still in high school on the Saaremaa island, in a sleepy peaceful town of Kuressaar, he began attending his first Marxist class and was reading Lenin's ISKRA. There were his first leaflets, written in his own hand, copied by hectograph and distributed by him and his friends; his first Marxist books and the first battle slogan spat out into the faces of the czar's policemen: "Down with Autocracy!" His first skirmishes with the powers that be. Everything was done for the first time, but from then on, forever.

As a son of a worker, a machinist at a tanning plant, he understood that only a pure accident, and the debilitating labor of his father, allowed him to finish secondary school. This is why he knew when he applied to the Petersburg University that he would have to rely only on himself.

However, the hungry student life also had its bright side for Viktor since it afforded him an opportunity to take part in the intense political life of that period. In the halls of the university illegal student gatherings and meetings of the Petersburg RSDRP Committee's Executive Commission took place, at which V.I.Lenin and his comrades in arms often spoke.

In the capital of the empire, an Estonian section of the Petersburg organization of the RSDRP was active at that time. V.Kingisepp was appointed a propagandist and plunged headlong into the workers' and students' movement. It is here that his great career as a professional revolutionary began.

When one ponders his life, what is most striking in it is his ability to compress, to concentrate time. Viktor Kingisepp had time for everything: he participated in meetings and gatherings, conducted propaganda work at workers' circles and made trips to Tallinn to debate with the Mensheviks.

The February Revolution saw him the commander of a medical train at the Transcaucasian front. Once back in Petrograd, Kingisepp again plunged into the revolutionary vortex. Comrades decided that Viktor would be most useful in Estonia.

Indeed, his help was very much needed there. The battle for the trust of the masses was being waged against conformists of every stripe. In the newspaper KIYR and at meetings and gathering of workers Kingisepp fought an uncompromising battle.

He organized the publication of a newspaper RAKHVA-LEKHT, the mouthpiece of the Narva RSDRP(B) Committee and conducted campaigns to enlist workers in the Red Guards. That activity was very timely: cossack divisions of the rebel general Kornilov were advancing against Petrograd. Fulfilling their internationalist duty to the revolutionary capital, at a risk to their own lives, Kingisepp and his comrades were able to stop their transport trains near Narva and to convince the cossacks of the antipopular nature of the rebellion.

In the troubled days before the October revolution, the newspaper TYOELINE published Kingisepp's article titled "One Step Forward, Right into the Fire!" He predicted an all-out fight with the forces of counter-revolution. At the joint meeting of the Revel and Estl-yand Soviets, the Military Revolutionary Committee was formed. Ivan Rabchinskiy was made its head, and Kingisepp became his deputy. In the days of the October, the committee entrusted Kingisepp with the most important tasks.

After the collapse of the Brest negotiations, the troops of the Kaiser's Germany invaded mainland Estonia. The undermanned Red Guards were unable to resist them. With the last boats, Kingisepp and his comrades evacuated to Helsingfors, and from there went to Petrograd.

After the dishonest Brest peace treaty was abrogated, Kingisepp looked more and more frequently to his native land. He knew that he had to go there. Dzerzhinskiy let him go for 2 or 3 weeks.

Thus began a new stage in V.Kingisepp's work: a life underground with its daily dangers, secret transfers from one apartment to the next and nameless cabins and hamlets. In these conditions he was building up the party's strength. In November 1920 he conducted the 1st Estonian Communist Party Congress. In accordance with his plan, communist workers got into the bourgeois parliament on the union ticket.

Twenty thousand people participated in the May 1, 1922, Tallinn demonstration under the slogans of the Workers' United Front. Its preparation turned out to be the last party task for V.Kingisepp. Betrayed, he was arrested on the night of May 2. The quickly held court martial sentenced him to death. He was shot in secret, at night. He had time to exclaim: "Long live Soviet Estonia!"

Instead of 2 or 3 weeks he spent underground three and a half years.

The history of the revolutionary struggle of the Estonian working class is inconceivable without Viktor Kingisepp. His thoughts and deeds are alive today, presenting more new sides the more in-depth his life and struggle are studied.

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# Former Georgian Menshevik-Era Emigre Recalled as 'Great Patriot'

18300258 [Editorial Report] Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian on 10 April 1988 carries on page 3 a 5,000word retrospective by Mikhail Dzhindzhikhashvili on the life of Ekvtime Takayshvili, Georgian historian, linguist, geographer, guardian of Georgian cultural relics, founder of the Historical and Ethnographic Society of Georgia, and one of the founders of Tbilisi State University. Dzhindzhikhashvili describes Takayshvili's reluctant emigration to France in 1921 in the company of the prized Georgian museum pieces that were removed by the Mensheviks following the Bolshevik victory in Georgia, and his subsequent 25-year effort to return these treasures to his native land, in which he ultimately succeeded. The article also includes a portion of Takayshvili's declaration written in September 1952 to then-First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee A. Meladze, in which he recounts his long years of service to his country and the subsequent repression he and his family suffered at the hands of Rukhadze, then Georgian Minister of State Security. Takayshvili died in 1953 and was denied burial in the Tbilisi State University courtyard as a consequence of the climate of fear that existed at the time. In 1963, at the request of scholars and other public figures, Takayshvili's remains were exhumed and reinterred in the Didubiskiy Pantheon. Dzhindzhikhashvili concludes with the suggestion that the home where Takayshvili spent his final years be turned into a museum so that everyone both young and old would hear the disturbing story of the happy and tragic fate of a great Georgian patriot."

#### Bishop of Tashkent, Central Asia Discusses Millennium, Church Concerns

18000375 Frunze SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA in Russian 24 Apr 88 p 3

[Interview with Lev, bishop of Tashkent and Central Asia by SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA correspondent R. Khelimskaya: "Good Feelings Remain"; date and place not specified]

[Text] The Central Asia Diocese, uniting the Uzbek, Kirghiz, Tajik and Turkmen Russian Orthodox deaneries, is one of the largest diocese in our country. Lev, bishop of Tashkent and Central Asia has headed the diocese since November of last year.

Our interlocutor was born in Belorussia after the war into the family of a clergyman. He graduated from the spiritual seminary and spiritual academy in Leningrad. He studied in Italy at the Papal Gregorian University and he headed the Russian Orthodox parish in Morocco.

Not long ago this representative of the leading Christian clergy was in Kirghizia participating in a meeting of ministers and the heads of the executive organs of the parishes of the Frunzenskiy deanery.

Bishop Lev states that presently there are 21 parishes in Kirghizia. "For the convenience of governing the diocese, I renewed a tradition characteristic of the Russian Orthodox Church, that of deaneries and district deans.

[Question] These are the posts introduced by the "Spiritual Reglament" in 1719 under Peter I...

[Answer] Presently in Kirghizia there are three deanery districts: the Frunzenskiy, the Issyk-Kulskiy and the Oshskiy.

[Question] As is known, by special resolution of UNESCO, the Millennium of the Christening of Rus will be celebrated around the world...

[Answer] At a meeting of church superiors held in Voskresenskiy Cathedral questions connected with the impending celebration of the Millennium of the Christening of Rus were discussed. And this is also the millennium of the Russian written language and literature and of Russian culture...

I related to the superiors how the preparation for the celebration is going in Moscow.

His Holiness the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Pimen has headed a special commission created in 1980 to prepare for celebrations to commemorate the millennium of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The historical-canonical group occupied itself with questions concerning the canonization of saints. Discussion involves those figures of bygone times who labored on

behalf of the homeland and the Church. Among them are the Grand Prince Dmitriy Donskoy and Bishop Ignatiy Bryanchaninov, who was a theologian and a man of deep spirituality, and others.

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The publishing group is completing the preparation of new anniversary publications. They are: Bibles, books on the life of the Church, recordings of church choirs, and others. The preparation of momentos is occupying the managerial committee. The draft of new statutes of the Russian Orthodox Church has been drawn up.

A working group under the leadership of Filaret, metropolitan of Minsk and Belorussia, is occupied with the inivitation of foreign guests to the anniversary celebrations. Festivities will begin in Moscow at the start of June.

From 6 to 9 June, a Local Council of the Russian Orthodox Church will be held at the Troyitsa-Sergiyevs-kaya Lavra and on 10 June a celebratory play and a festive concert will be held at the Bolshoy Theater.

Anniversary celebrations will be continued in Kiev, Vladimir and Leningrad. These are cities in which the seat of the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church was located at various times.

[Question] How will this historical date be celebrated in our republic?

[Answer] The Millennium will be celebrated in the Central Asia Diocese as well as separately in each republic.

In Kirghizia it will be in September. Anniversary liturgies will be conducted in all parishes. The Voskresenskiy Cathedral in Frunze will be the center of celebrations.

[Question] The changes which are occurring today in our society one way or another affect every person, including the believer...

[Answer] I can state with confidence that the Orthodox believers of Kirghizia welcome and support with deep satisfaction the process of democratization, social-economic transformation and moral purification. The Church appeals to laymen to actively participate in restructuring and in the development and perfection of our society.

The diocese's believers participate in the peace movement and do what they can to financially assist the Soviet Peace Fund, and they support with all their hearts the peace initiatives of the Soviet state.

[Question] While you were in Kirghizia you had the opportunity to see the internal church life of individual organizations. What impressions were you left with?

[Answer] I visited all the parishes in the Frunzenskiy deanery. In some of them I conducted liturgies and familiarized myself with their problems.

For example, for the last 8 years the Orthodox in the city of Rybache have been petitioning for the registration of their religious community. I broached this question when I was received by the republic's Council of Ministers. There is a basis for hoping for a positive decision on this question.

The believers in the village of Kalininsk also have problems. Their parish needs a new church to be built. The exterior and interior condition of not all churches is satisfactory. But this, as they say, is our internal business and the concern of church councils.

I am new to Central Asia and am in Kirghizia for the first time. I am left with good impressions. I came away from conversations in the republic's Council of Ministers and Council on Religious Affairs with a feeling of mutual understanding and cooperation.

And this is the main thing.

#### Concert Draws on Legacy of Religious Music

18000370 [Editorial Report] Moscow LITERATUR-NAYA GAZETA on 11 May 88 carries on page 3 a 500-word article about a concert given in the Great Hall of the D.D. Shostakovich Leningrad Philharmonic. The concert was given as a portion of the Celebration of Slavic Literature and Culture dedicated to the millennium of written Russian literature and music: "In other words, to the millennium of a prominent historical event—the Christening of Rus."

The second half of the concert began with a male choir's performance of "an ancient spiritual song," a "stikhira" [Old Believer's chant] written by Ivan IV. The author of the article, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Ilya Fonyakov, concluded that "that evening, the voice of our own history resounded from the stage of the Philharmonic...."

The concert was organized by the RSFSR Ministry of Culture, the Academy of Sciences, the Academy of Arts, and other creative unions.

CULTURE 22

# Estonian Cultural Unions Propose Sweeping Radical Reforms

18000309 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 8 Apr 88 p 3

[Excerpts from review by P. Raydla, F. Kaazik and R. Amos: "Caused by Restructuring: Joint Plenum of the Boards of ESSR Creative Unions"]

[Excerpts] Only the restructuring being carried out by the party in all areas of society's life, from economics to human relations, can cause as tempestuous an upsurge in social activeness, as that displayed at the joint plenum of the boards of Estonia's creative unions, held over the course of several days. Writers, artists, composers, architects, journalists and actors discussed the role of the republic's creative intelligentsia in implementing the resolutions of the 27th CPSU Congress and in preparations for the 19th All-Union Party Conference.

The range of problems discussed was extraordinarily broad. Conversation was honest and frank. Restructuring has revitalized a phenomenon which had nearly been forgotten-pluralism of opinions, i.e., the right of every person to have his own opinion on events and phenomena and his right to uphold it. Life has restored the saying that the truth is born through argument. The concept of political discussion is returning to general use. All of this was clearly manifested at the plenum. Not all of the opinions expressed there met unanimous approval. Some agreed with one thing, others with another. For one person the problems raised there were familiar and understood, for another, they were inapplicable. However, it is certain that everything said at the plenum was dictated by sincere efforts to untie the tight knots caused by mistakes and the crimes of the periods of the cult of personality and of stagnation, without which it is impossible to advance forward, and was dictated by a feeling of civic duty, either correctly or incorrectly understood.

It is impossible to totally convey all that was said at the plenum during the more than 20 hours of stressed work, over a period of less than a week, in a brief review, which does not enable one thoroughly to interpret, analyze and evaluate the problems raised at the plenum. Therefore, the task of our review is to help the general reader understand the basic themes upon which the orators concentrated.

#### **Development of Democracy and Glasnost**

Among the most radical of the changes already being implemented in our society is the democratization of all social life, the open discussion of vital problems, of which the entire course of the joint plenum was an example as well. It is precisely lack of democracy which was one of the gravest consequences of the Stalinist

period, having caused gaps in economics, politics and the spiritual sphere. Therefore, it is no surprise that the speeches of plenum participants on these problems were particularly sharp.

It is impossible to imagine a democracy which is not centered around man (writer V. Beekman). Unfortunately, recentralization, frightening in its inhumanity, had blocked democracy. The central departments turned into empires of a sort, lording it over the mother country and obligingly supported by local vassals. The colossal centralized mechanism distributed everything—people, resources and territory. Today, the bureaucratic apparatus is intensifying its own activity at an unprecedented pace, in order to justify its own useless existence.

The republic leaders consider their resolutions to be definitive and many problems are generated precisely by this. Union departments thrust new enterprises upon Estonia without even considering economic expediency. All the metal for an object, such as metal-intensive barges, is brought in from outside the republic, yet the bulk of the production is sent back as far as to the Black Sea (A. Eygi). This sort of departmental stupidity is, to say the least, criminal.

The mass information media support glasnost to a significant extent. However, in the opinion of plenum participants, far from everything is in order in its work. A great deal of incomplete, half-true information is still being published. A great deal is still silently overlooked. The gap between information published in Estonian and that in Russian in the republic's press is great. The lack of authenticity in publications of both the Russianlanguage mass information media of the ESSR and the central media is particularly alarming (writer R. Raud). Information about the republic, addressed beyond its borders, is often tendentious and incorrect. Pressure on the mass information media continues: direct radio broadcasts from conferences of the council on culture of the creative unions have been cut short. Thanks to all of this, the belief that Estonians were a primitive people, devoid of culture or even literacy, to say nothing of science and an intelligentsia, until the revolution in 1940, has almost been shaped in the country. A question arises: in whose interests is the shaping of such an image of the Estonian people? (R. Yarlik)

Forbidden themes continue to exist in art and attempts are being made to retain them in life as well. Writer Ya. Yyeryuyut believes that the topic of regional cost-accounting autonomy is being banned in the republic's Russian-language press. Topics related to the life of Estonians abroad are also banned.

#### Managing in the New Way

It is obvious to everyone that not everything is in order in the republic's management. The new general system for managing the economy was not discussed by the ESSR Supreme Soviet deputies without a purpose. However, it is not simply a matter of economic management. The roots of the problem go deeper. They lie in questions of democracy, in questions about which Lenin has already spoken: not only "for whom to manage" but also "whom to manage." Over the years of Stalinist centralization and stagnation a barrier has risen between the managers and the managed—the bureaucracy and the people.

The basic contradiction which threatens conflict, said M. Lauristin, is that between the wills and aspirations of the people and the conservatism of the republic's management. Essentially, it is a matter of a crisis of trust. The officials have an enormous privilege—they have information at their disposal. They know which resolution will be adopted. The people do not know this, nor do they know precisely why such a resolution is being adopted. Hence arises distrust (composer L. Sumera). Unfortunately, a situation has formed in which the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee and the republic government have become not the intermediaries in transmitting the will of the people "on upwards," but the transmitters of will from the "top" downwards. A fundamental change in the power structure is needed. Among the suggestions made at the plenum, one concerned direct elections of the republic's higher leaders. Besides competence, we should also demand of such leaders that they desire and know how to associate with the masses (F. Undusk). We must achieve a situation in which each citizen is responsible for and in a condition to influence the course of affairs in government (writer Kh. Kiyk). Meanwhile, the state opposes the person.

The work of ESSR Communist Party Central Committee and ESSR Council of Ministers leaders and of these agencies on the whole was heavily criticized in a number of speeches. Plenum participants noted that neither K. Vayno, central committee first secretary, nor B. Saul, ESSR Council of Ministers chairman, had seen fit to attend the plenum (M. Mikiver, R. Veydemann, K. Komissarov, Kh. Runnel and others). V. Beekman declared that the republic leadership sometimes attempts to visit appropriate edicts upon displays of democracy, to prove that the process of democratization is harmful.

The new system for economic management of the republic will soon be discussed at a session of the ESSR Supreme Soviet, but society has yet to see the draft. Unfortunately, this draft, like the previous ones, was written by a small circle of initiates and will be adopted without consulting the people. However, I. Toome explained that, as far as he knows, the system will only be discussed at the session and not approved.

#### **Economics and Ecology**

The problems in this area which were discussed at the plenum are essentially familiar. First, the idea of cost-accounting at the republic level was raised. As A.

Keyerna, ESSR Academy of Sciences vice president, emphasized, economic scientists are now concentrating their efforts on developing the theoretical and practical foundations for such cost-accounting, on the concept of socioeconomic development and on forecasting scientific and technical progress in the ESSR.

A contradiction has sprung up between the Law on the State Enterprise and the 5-year plans under the new conditions of economic management. Unfortunately, economic science is still unable to answer all of the questions being raised. One of the most important tasks awaiting it is to achieve a reasonable combination and unity among state, regional, departmental and personal interests. At the present time we are a long way from this.

It was noted at the plenum that the problems of reorganizing the republic's economy require broad glasnost. In drafting the new economic management system, the Estonian government began with the principle of granting greater rights and opportunities to solve problems locally, and of the inexpedience of duplicating the allunion management structure. However, in this regard, the agreement to convert the union-republic Ministry of Industrial Construction Materials to full union subordination is not entirely comprehensible. Furthermore, under the new system a great part of industry remains beyond the competence of republic authorities. This seems like a rearrangement of all the domino pieces. (P.-E. Rummo)

Plenum participants suggested presenting the new general system of managing the ESSR economy for broad discussion by society and adopting a definitive political resolution on the republic's conversion to cost-accounting.

Ecological problems are also inseparably linked to economic problems. The problem of the Rakvereskiy phosphorite deposit serves as an example of this: union department bureaucrats have no qualms about garbling the initial data. The USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production claims that development of the deposit is vitally necessary, even though, according to experts who spoke at the plenum, fertilizer production could be expanded to meet the same volume by reducing raw material losses during its extraction on the Kola Peninsula and during processing, which would be cheaper by a factor of over 2. However, the new development is not simply a matter of tons, but of honor and glory. But what will become of Estonia?

Many spoke of the project for reconstructing or expanding the Baltic State Regional Electric Power Station (GRES). It was noted that the claim that a new power-generating unit is needed to supply heat for Narva does not accord with the truth. At the present time, the project does not meet ecological requirements to any extent and does not stipulate sufficiently reliable measures against releases of carbon monoxide and dust. These releases will surpass even the norms operating in our country,

exceeding the standards set in most European countries several times over. We must not allow the use of natural resources without observing the need to preserve the natural environment for future generations. We must speak out against this as a unified front. The time of the lone hero, his chest across the gun embrasure, is past (journalist A. Payu).

In the ESSR Council of Ministers address, responding to rebukes for neglecting ecological problems, A. Soydla, Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Buro candidate member and ESSR Council of Ministers first deputy chairman, noted that, very likely, inadequate information about the republic government's activity revealed itself in the course of the discussion. Two years ago, a definitive rejection had already been issued to a union department on constructing an oil-tanker port in Muuga. A program is being drafted, the purpose of which is to create a rational system for protecting nature, in the interests of preserving the health of people and the biosphere. The program will go into effect during the 13th 5-year period; within it, nature-protecting projects are on an equal footing with sociocultural projects. The condition of the northeast Estonian ecosystem, the agricultural environment and the sea environment will be put under special control. The republic government adopted a firm resolution to the effect that the development of phosphorites using existing technologies contradicts the interests of the people; that is why consent was also denied for creating an experimental mine. The Baltic GRES really has been amortized and needs reconstruction, but the republic government believes that before work on the project even begins it should be carried out in accordance with nature-protecting require-

I. Toome, Estonian Communist Party Central Committee secretary, noted in his concluding speech that most of our republic's urgent problems had been raised at the joint plenum, and that the plenum indisputably had provided serious food for thought and specific actions:

Criticism at the plenum of the leading republic authorities has been listened to very seriously. I see my own serious shortcomings here as well and I can assure you that my colleagues and I shall carefully examine all of your suggestions and make the appropriate conclusions.

Before us lies a very large and complex political task, of which the people will make the definitive evaluation. For this, both a store of new ideas, as well as our generally peaceful and reasonable approach, are necessary.

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#### Western Media Reports on 'Angleterre' Protest Leaders Disputed

18000295a Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 26 Mar 88p 8

[Article by Ye. Varentsov: "Two at the 'Angleterre', The Parting of the Ways of Two Who Protested the Demolition of This Historic Building"]

[Text] The people of Leningrad who rushed to the former "Angleterre" hotel, once the scene of Sergey Yesenin's tragic suicide, came for different purposes. Some were distressed at the fate of the venerable building. Others foresaw a scandal and hurried to take part in it. Among the protesters on Isaakiyevskaya Square during those March days in 1987 were the leader of the "Spaseniye" group, Aleksey Kovalev, and the artist Yuliy Rybakov.

"Here's restructuring for you!" said the sceptics, watching the walls of the building crumble. Some shrugged their shoulders, at a loss to explain what was happening... We spend a great deal of time talking about how our youth must be educated not by our words, but by our deeds. Yet, it was youth, obstinate and energetic, who defended our cultural heritage, and those to whom they addressed their protests and passionate speeches, full of the impatience of youth, were simply at a loss. But that was not the end of it, after the "Angleterre" incidents, some of those in charge were possessed by the desire to "settle up" in the old way with the refractory organizers of the meeting. When 24-year-old Aleksey Kovalev, a historian by training, needed a recommendation from the komosomol gorkom for his second matriculation at Leningrad University, he was indeed given one. But what sort of a recommendation was it? "Political myopia," "lack of fastidiousness in the methods and tactics he chooses to use in his cultural campaigns," enlists the participation of "hooligans and socially alien elements" in his activities. Was this justified? No! This becomes increasingly obvious.

Naturally, the Western mass information media were unable to resist this "juicy" fact, and interpreted it to suit them. The American paper, the CHICAGO TRIBUNE, for example, spoke of the genuine "persecution" of Kovalev. And the "Voice of America" radio station reported that he had "not been permitted to continue his studies at the university." And not one word was said about the fact that A. Kovalev had recently graduated from Leningrad University and was preparing to reenroll there as a day student in the department of Eastern Studies. And after all, obtaining a second higher education, entailing as it does continued absence from productive work, is permitted only in exceptional cases for obvious economic reasons.

Certain "home-grown correspondents" also "expanded on" the situation in the their own ways.

"Kovalev, a 27-year-old (?) historian, one of the initiators of the campaign to save the 'Angleterre'..., was promptly summoned to the military commissariat where he was given the choice of either entering the army immediately with the current group of draftees or waiting until fall and going to Afghanistan for 3 years as an officer. Kovalev chose the latter alternative."

This is a quotation from the independent paper "Glasnost," published by Muscovite S. Grigoryants. This paper has been a great success with Western journalists, who extract "objective" information on life in the USSR from its pages.

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Acquaintances who encountered Aleksey Kovalev, were astonished, "What are you doing here? We heard that you had gone to Afghanistan long ago!" Aleksey would shrug his shoulders, "What nonsense is this?"

Here is "glasnost" for you — as interpreted by Grigoryants.

In this morass of rumors and unjust decisions, it would have been easy to assume the pose of the victim and aggravate the conflict. Kovalev and "Spaseniye" have chosen a different path: with other unofficial groups they are forming a council on cultural ecology to be associated with the Leningrad division of the Soviet Culture Fund. At its meetings, the council discusses ways to preserve the monuments of the past and to get the community involved in this project. These young people are demanding true glasnost in matters of city planning. And yet, S. Shevchuk, a journalist for the VECHERNIY LENINGRAD, in an article entitled "Shine and Reap," has attempted to convince his readers that these people are asking for too much, that they want to become something tantamount to "some kind of fantastic superagency with authority to exercise universal monitoring and management of the city." Experience has shown that it is imperative that public opinion monitor the performance of agencies concerned with repair and restoration of buildings.

But how are those who wish us ill using our blunders? The statement by the journalist from VECHERNIY LENINGRAD was cited by the emigre paper RUSS-KAYA MYSL, published in Paris, to confirm their theory that a conflict is brewing between the authorities and the "independent community," which is virtually pronouncing a sentence on the regime. In such circles they feel nothing but delight at articles containing unjustified accusations and scathing, inflammatory phrases, degrading to human dignity.

Recently, our own press was able to cast light on the nature of many unoffical associations. And useful initiatives by Leningrad's "informal" groups were given encouragement. When, in September of last year, A. Kovalev and his comrades in the Council of Cultural Ecology came to the defense of house No 16 on Bolshaya Raznochinnaya Street, both LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA and SMENA printed pieces criticizing the unsound practice of demolishing buildings without considering public opinion. And not long ago, in January, when the members of this coalition were trying to save a stone house, built at the end of eighteenth or beginning of the nineteenth century in the old village of Rybatskiy in the outskirts of Leningrad, which was slated for demolition and convert it into a museum of local history, the journalist N. Andreyev aptly noted in the newspaper VECHERNYY LENINGRAD: "It would be a blessing if all those in authority would have such ideas for themselves, without waiting for the public to begin to hold meetings on the subject." After all, it should have been obvious from the start that the unceremonious way the city planners laid a pipeline through an ancient cemetary, demolishing the five-walled huts — examples of Russian rural architecture — and leveling hills and ravines between the rivers Slavyanka and Murzinka, would not engender "warm feelings" in the hearts of those who hold precious the ancient look of the city on the Neva.

Thus, this difficult problem must be solved by everyone working together, a common language must be found! Young enthusiasts concerned with preserving remains of the past must be viewed not as rivals, but as kindred spirits, comrades in arms! How, for example, did the architects react to what happened in Rybatskiy? The city's chief architect S. Sokolov met with members of the "informal groups" and promised to preserve the old house. The Leningrad city isolkom passed a resolution to build more brick houses here using individual designs. And it was no coincidence that A. Kovalev, boardmember of the Leningrad Division of the Cultural Fund, speaking to delegates from unofficial groups from 20 cities of the country, talked of the need for close cooperation with state and official public welfare organizations, because the only way to fight for the preservation of our cultural heritage is all together. "I wish our wonderful young people a full and rich "cultural life," said Academician D.S. Likhachev, chairman of the Soviet Culture Fund, in a farewell address to the meet-

Aleksey Kovalev has become a popular figure. His passion for protecting historical monuments cannot help but appeal to the unprejudiced. His frankness and sincerity are impressive. However, it would be a mistake to idealize him, to make him into some kind of "hero" of restructuring. This is a stupid thing to do in any case, and Aleksey is far from an ideal. He is arrogant, unobjective, and intolerant of other people's opinions. And, after all, popularity is an insidious thing: it can turn against anyone who loses touch with reality. How can he have forgotten that he only has the right to criticize others if he himself is capable of self-criticism and sober evaluation of the performance of his comrades in "Spaseniye"?

I think that the time has also come to think seriously, not so much about meetings and resolutions, as about concrete results. The way things currently stand, there are far more people who propose, advise, and insist than people who decide and take action, assuming full responsibility for what they have said. After all, it is precisely this line of responsibility for the present day that distinguishes those who are truly fighting for restructuring from those who merely appear to be doing so; which separates true partisans, no matter how harsh their words and deeds are at times, from the demagogues and windbags, whose only interest in democratization is to satisfy their own ambitions.

On that March day, Yuliy Andreyevich Rybakov was also in the crowd at the "Angleterre." What brought this man to the square? Let us devote a little more attention

to him. He himself considers himself to be an artist and a man of culture, who has a full right to raise his voice in the defense of cultural values. And yet it is exactly this right which is subject to doubt. How can the acts of vandalism which he committed with one O. Volkov, barbaric defacement of the walls of cultural monuments by painting them with anti-Soviet slogans, be considered mere childish pranks. After all, it was not chalk they used, but paint. The inscriptions appeared on the wall of the Gosudareva Bastion of the Petropavlovsk Fort, on the parapet of the embankment at Pushkin Square, on the pedestal of the statue of "Hercules" at the Admiralty, on the walls of conservatories... In the course of this vandalism, typerwriters, tape recorders with acoustic tapes, a military radio receiver, and a rubber inflatable mattress were stolen. For the theft and his malicious hooliganism involving defacement and defiling of cultural monuments, the people's court sentenced Rybakov to six years in prison.

The man served out his sentence, it would seem that his guilt has been expatiated. Why should we be bringing up the sins of his past now? There would have been no need to do so if Yuliy Andreevich himself had not tried to rewrite his past, had not represented himself as some kind of "political warrior" against red tape during the years of stagnation, and portrayed his actions smacking clearly of criminality as as an act of "civic courage." He has written extensively on this subject in letters to the major newspapers

"Indeed," acknowledges Rybakov in his letters, "at that time I was actively involved in the use of the equipment we stole to print a samizdat paper, and in painting the walls of the city with slogans and appeals condemning Soviet domestic policies of those years." Evidently, he simply forgot to mention the other stolen items and has modestly dubbed the walls of architectural monuments the "walls of the city." He applies the phrase"condemnatory slogans" to such malicious inscriptions as "The CPSU is the enemy of the people!" and "The USSR is the peoples' prison!" Rybakov attempts to strike the pose of someone who has "suffered for the truth" are in vain. On what grounds can hooliganism and theft be considered appropriate techniques for combatting red tape?

And glasnost reveals a great deal here. The "former" guardians of freedom feel uncomfortable in its light. Great was the indignation of the aforementioned editor of the samizdat paper GLASNOST, S. Grigoryants, when VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA ran an article about his own past, which is far from unblemished from the standpoint of criminal law. You cannot flout the facts. It is no wonder that when the latter-day "activists" of restructuring could not find support at home, they appealed to the Western press, to those foreign correspondents who have no scruples about half-truths and are willing to close their eyes to the fact that the source of their information is a spring which is far from crystal-clear.

A sample of such "mutually beneficial" collaboration is provided by the remarks of the Moscow correspondent of the American newspaper CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Thomas Shanker concerning his meetings with the organizers of the "council of the 'Epicenter' democratic cultural movement," Leningrad residents, Yu. Rybakov, Ye. Zelinskaya, and P. Kozhevnikov. What did the journalist find out from his encounters with the "true heroes of glasnost," to use his words? I quote: "Spaseniye' and a number of other unofficial youth groups have united in a coalition known as 'Epicenter.""

All the young people belonging to these informal youth groups know that this information is not true. They never refer to 'Epicenter' as anything other than "that useless scrap of paper," since the rolls of the associations belonging to it are inflated.

The organizers of the "council of democratic cultural movements" operate in a "global" arena and are lavish in their promises. Ye. Zelinskaya in an interview with Thomas Shanker states that the "Epicenter" group has prepared itself in advance for the new elections to the Soviets of Peoples' Deputies. by diligently studying the USSR Constitution. "We know the law better than they do," she claims, "they won't take us with their bare hands."

"You understand," Rybakov explained to the journalist. "Our current goal is not the forming of a political party. But time will tell. If the necessity arises and if this is what the people want, they will create such a party. If not, then they won't..." "These people," concludes Thomas Shanker, "have an understanding of democracy which is much closer to ours, than to any classical communist concept of democracy."

Democracy's "warrior" Rybakov felt compelled to "live up to" this high evaluation... Already letters are going out to newspapers, television stations, and Soviet agencies. Yu. Rybakov, R. Yevdokimov, and V. Pogorilyy are announcing the establishment of a branch of the "international human rights organization" in Leningrad. This is an organization consisting essentially of professional anti-Soviets. Its chief object is to compose sermons on "human rights violations" in the USSR.

Now everything falls into place. The "activists" of restructuring are not worried about the fate of the "Angleterre," but the scandal surrounding it. Their concern is not with the ecological consequences of building a dam in the Gulf of Finland, but with making political hay out of those consequences. They are not interested in the development of socialist democracy, but in using it for their own purposes. And it is no accident that Thomas Shanker headed one of his pieces "An alternative political party will provide a test of Gorbachev's words on his intentions to introduce reforms." Pardon me, but this smacks of provocation, as defined of old.

On that March day, they both — Yu. Rybakov and A. Kovalev — stood at the "Angleterre." But time, the very logic of the process of democratization, sent them off in different directions, to different poles of the life of our society.

**Economic Implications of Low Birthrate, Family Aid Policy Examined** 

18300233 Moscow PLANOVOYE KHOZYAYSTVO in Russian No l, Jan 88 pp 82-85

[Article by N. Rimashevskaya, doctor of economic sciences, professor, and A. Milovidov, candidate in economic sciences: "On Improving State Aid to Families With Children (On the Order of a Discussion)]

[Text] In connection with the need for accelerating economic and social development, the increased effectiveness of social policy is becoming a rather current problem. One of the directions of this policy is state aid to families in material support and upbringing of children.

Especially increased significance is being ascribed to such a form of state aid as monetary grants paid to families with children. These grants are paid to improve the material position of these families in relation to the achieved average level of well-being and to level out the income of families which have children and those which do not. We must note that certain authors believe that these grants stimulate the birth rate, but in our opinion the course of recent demographic development does not confirm this.

The sum of family subsidies in our country includes the following types: grants for pregnancy and childbirth, for the birth of a child, for caring for an infant under 1 year of age, grants to single mothers, grants to families with many children, and grants for children of low- income families. [1] This system has developed gradually. In 1944, grants to single mothers were introduced in the sum of 5 rubles per month until the child reached the age of 16. At that time, the average monthly wage of workers and employees in the USSR national economy comprised 33 rubles. Therefore, the grant was a noticeable addition to the family budget. However, due to the growth of the labor wage and income, the significance of this type of aid has gradually diminished. In the 70's part of the single mothers, considering this aid to be paltry, did not even file for it. In 1981 the amount of the average monthly grant to single mothers was increased to 20 rubles. At the present time there are about 1.5 million single mothers who receive this grant. In the late 70's there were only about half as many.

The system of one-time and monthly payments to mothers having many children has been in effect for a long time (Table 1).

As of 1981, one-time grants have been paid also upon the birth of the first 3 children in the family: 50 rubles upon the birth of the first child, and 100 rubles for the birth of the second and third.

Statistical data testify to the fact that having many children as a socio-demographic process bears a temporal character, and a strictly local one in a geographical sense at that. In the last quarter century the number of families with many children in the country has declined to almost 1/2 the previous number, and comprises 1.9 million. The most significant reduction has occurred in the number of families with 4, 5, and 6 children. Around 70 percent of the families with many children live in the southern rayons. For example, half of them live in Central Asia. When the subsidies for large families were being introduced, there was no such delineation. There was also a large number of families having many children in the central rayons of the country as well.

All regions have noted a tendency toward a reduced number of children in families. Nevertheless, territorial differences in the average size of the family are being retained. In the RSFSR, UkSSR, BSSR and in the Pre-Baltic region and Moldavia, families with 1 and 2 children comprise the overwhelming majority (over 90 percent), while in Central Asia the portion of families with 4 or more children remains quite significant: from 14 percent in Kirghizia to 31 percent in Tajikistan.

Table 1

	Amounts of gra	nts paid (rubles) monthly*
Grants for birth of child:		
fourth	64	4
fifth	85	6
sixth	100	7
seventh	125	10
eighth	125	10
ninth	175	12.5
tenth	175	12.5
eleventh and each subsequent	250	15

\*Paid from the child's second birthday and until he reaches 5 years of age.

As of September 1974, for purposes of overcoming poverty in families with small children, a special grant was introduced for families with an average per capita level of income which does not exceed 50 rubles per month (for a number of northern and eastern rayons the amount is 75 rubles effective as of 1984). This grant amounts to 12 rubles per month for each child under 8 years of age. In 1985, 1 billion rubles were paid out from the budget for this purpose. The family receives 144 rubles for each child during the year. The computations show that there were about 7 million children in lowincome families. If we assume that in such a family the grant is paid simultaneously for an average of 2 children, then the number of low-income families would comprise 3.5 million, while the overall population figures in such families, including adults, reaches about 14 million people, or 5 percent of the entire population.

By 1990, due to the overall growth in income, there will practically be no more such families, since the income in low-income families is increasing at a higher rate. Thus,

in 1970, 18 percent of the population had an income over 100 rubles a month per family member, while in 1985 this figure already exceeded 60 percent of the population. Considering this fact, the decision was made to increase to 12 the age of children in low-income families for whom grants would be paid. This decision would become effective in the 12th Five-Year Plan.

Certain authors believe that such a measure will reduce the differentiation in material provision and will facilitate the elimination of inadequate income. The results of a survey of the level and style of life of urban families which we performed in 1968 and 1978 in Taganrog do not allow us to agree with this conclusion.

Low-income level as an economic phenomenon is closely tied with the differentiation in the labor wage and the family income. These grants, even if they are significantly increased, cannot overcome this differentiation. As the general well-being, the average wage and the average per capita income increase, the "threshold" of poverty-level income also changes. Thus, in the 10 years between the two surveys in Taganrog, the average per capita nominal income of families increased by more than 1.5 times. The level of the lowest incomes also increased. The portion of families with income considered to be at the poverty level has declined several times over, while the portion of relatively low-income families (whose income has remained below the average) has remained practically unchanged. Consequently, the group of families with income which has increased 1.5-fold must again be related to the low-income group, since the relation between low, average and high income has remained the same. The gradual reduction in the portion of relatively low-income households is associated with the reduction in the differentiation of the labor wage and income, i.e., with a reduction in the differences between labor itself.

The grants which we have examined practically do not increase the income of families. According to the data of surveys which reflect the situation typical for industrial cities in the European part of the country, the relative share of the grants in the overall family income does not exceed one-tenth of a percent. Such a state of affairs is observed in low-income as well as in average- and high-income families [2].

For families living in the rural regions of Azerbaijan (where a survey of similar purpose was also conducted), in 1977 a low-income grant was paid for all children under 8 years of age. However, this was motivated not so much by the fact that the many children placed all the rural families into the low-income bracket as by the inadequacy of methods for computing the income from personal subsidiary farms. As a result, despite the clear differentiation in the material position of rural families, the overwhelming majority of them formally had income below 50 rubles per month per family member.

The survey results show that receiving grants for children leads to the formulation of the opinion by a large portion of the population that child support is primarily the task of the state. Therefore, complaints were often expressed about the small amounts of these grants and the cessation of their payment upon the child's reaching 8 years of age (when the children enter school, they said, the expenditures for them increase).

Also, it is hardly correct to consider many children in a family to be the reason for low income. This notion is formulated on the basis of information obtained from state budget statistics, which use the sectorial principle of family sampling. In this instance, only the families of those who are working are taken into the sampling. However, according to our data, which were obtained with the application of the territorial principle of family sampling, among the low income families the greatest portion is comprised, first of all, of the families of "pure" pensioners, secondly, of families where the mother is temporarily not working due to the birth of a child, and finally, of single-parent families with 1 or 2 children. Therefore, we believe that the problem of increasing the income of low-income families must be solved primarily by means of improving the pension system and by giving material aid to each family during that period when a new child is born into it and the mother, in most cases, temporarily ceases to work.

As we know, such aid has been given as of 1981, when gradually by regions of the country a partially paid maternity child-care leave was paid until the child reaches I year of age. Working women and those who were going to school began receiving a grant in the amount of 35 rubles per month (in a number of rayons—50 rubles).

The years which have passed have shown that such form of aid has actively influenced the demographic behavior of young families. Moreover, the payment of these grants gives women more favorable possibilities for combining their role as mother with their participation in social production. This shows the important socio- economic effect of this measure.

The introduction of these grants has also facilitated to a certain degree an improvement in the demographic situation. In the last 4 years, the birthrate has been at its highest level for the entire post-war period in all the republics. On the background of the overall rise, we see notable "peaks" in the birth rate in 1983 and 1986 in the RSFSR, UkSSR, BSSR and the Baltic region, i.e., the years immediately following the introduction of the series of family aid measures and the measures for combatting drunkenness here.

If we abstract ourselves from the rise in 1986 which was caused, in our opinion, by the measures to combat drunkenness and alcoholism, then the increase in the birth rate in 1983-1985 is associated with the following basic reasons. First of all, it has been quite telling that the

period of introduction of the measures has coincided with the change in the number of women who are in the most favorable age for bearing children, 20-29. Today in the country they account for over 70 percent of the annual births. It was specifically at the end of 1983 that the numbers of this group of women throughout the country as a whole as well as in the 6 above-named republics reached their maximal value. Later, up to the mid-90's, due to the echo-like effect of the consequences of the war, we may expect a regular "drop" in the number of women of this age, and all at the expense of the RSFSR, UkSSR, BSSR and the Baltic region. With all other conditions being equal, this will cause a decline in the birth rate as compared with 1983. Its first indicators already appeared in 1984-1985 in the RSFSR and UkSSR. However, the next year the number of births in these republics unexpectedly increased to the 1983 level.

Secondly, the increased birth rate has been affected by the desire of some spouses to time the birth of their child with the times of introduction of incentives, thus realizing the decision to have children which they had previously put off. Thirdly, the order of the implementation of these measures in the country has had an effect. They were last to be introduced in the republics of Central Asia, the Transcaucauses and Kazakhstan. After their implementation in 1983, the portion of births occurring in these republics within the overall number of births in the USSR again began to increase.

Probably the main demographic effect of the reviewed measure was the change in the indicator for order of birth of children. Prior to the introduction of these measures in republics with a low birth rate, particularly in urban areas, there was a clear tendency toward growth in the relative share of first-born children, i.e., the process of a transition to the one-child family was in progress. After 1981 there was a notable increase here in the proportion of numbers of second and third children, as well as an increase in the birth rate for women 25-29 and 30-34 years of age. Another positive factor is the fact that the proportion of numbers of second and third children continues to grow even after 1983, which in our opinion testifies to the effective influence of the implemented measures on the structure of the birth rate.

At the same time, we cannot relate all the positive instances in the country's demographic development solely to the examined grants. Undoubtedly, these shifts were determined also by a series of other measures in social policy which have been taken in recent years and associated with the resolution of the Food Program, the improvement of housing conditions, pension provision and development of public health, the struggle against drunkenness, etc. We believe that the continued increase in the level and quality of life which is outlined for the future may create the necessary material and spiritual prerequisites for a gradual transition from a one-child family to a two- or three-child family. We may even assume that the further increase in the income level will

no longer be accompanied by those negative demographic consequences which were noted up until recent times, and that after a certain time it will have a favorable effect on the growth in the number of births.

As we know, among other measures directed at increasing the level of life and strengthening aid to the family, the 12th Five-Year Plan provides for an increase in the duration of partially paid leave from 1 to 1.5 years, and a respective increase in the length of unpaid leave from 1.5 to 2 years. This will require additional monetary funds and will increase the number of women who are temporarily not employed in social production.

Particular attention should be given to the last of the above-mentioned aspects of the problem, because up until the mid-90's the growth in the number of ablebodied persons in the country will be extremely low, and in a number of areas its absolute reduction is anticipated. What does it mean to expand the mother's right not to work for up to 2 years after the birth of a child under the conditions that everyone would exercise this right? It would mean that 10-11 million women would quit work, while at the present time, according to our computations, around 8 million women do not work for up to 1-1.5 years in order to raise their children.

In the 12th and 13th Five-Year Plans the growth in the number of able- bodied persons will be approximately equal to the number of women who will receive a 2-year leave of absence. Moreover, the number of persons attending educational institutions while on leave from production will also increase. Thus, there will in fact be no increase in the number of persons employed in social production.

This problem also has a financial aspect. In the 11th Five-Year Plan the state budget expenditures for rendering aid to families with children almost doubled, reaching 5.4 billion rubles in 1985. Specifically, the total sum of grants paid for pregnancy and childbirth comprised 2.2 billion rubles, for caring for newborns up to 1 year of age—1.4 billion rubles, for low-income families—1 billion, in connection with the birth of a child—0.2 billion, for mothers with many children—0.3 billion, and for single mothers—0.3 billion rubles. However, despite the constant increase in funds, the portion of grants is rather insignificant in the family budget. Moreover, it is gradually diminishing.

However, the main shortcoming is the lack of correspondence of the grants (with the exception of the grant for partially paid leave of absence) to the changed conditions in the demographic behavior of the overwhelming majority of married couples. With the retention of the existing system of state aid, these altered conditions may lead in the future to negative economic-demographic consequences—to the reduction of the overall number of population and an increase in the relative share of the aged. The grants paid to families with many children and with low income do not influence actively enough the

increase in the number of families having 2 or 3 children, whose presence is a necessary condition for the reproduction of the generations. One of the main goals of demographic policy must be to eliminate demographic waves, i.e., the achievement of an approximately equal number of children born in the country each year. This requires a large increase in the birth rate.

In connection with the limitation of financial means, which may be directed toward expanding state aid to the family, it is necessary to select the most effective and the most high-priority direction for this aid. We believe that this direction must be the grant for partially paid leave of absence. When it is paid, the woman receives the most favorable possibilities for combining the role of mother with her participation in social production.

The grants for pregnancy and childbirth, as well as for partially paid maternity leave of absence to care for the newborn, must comprise the basis for a single family grant. Other forms of payments, primarily to low-income families and families with many children, whose sum of expenditures currently equal 1.2 billion rubles, should not be given, since they are associated in one way or another with the birth and support of a child and may be taken into consideration in the singular grant. Even if we do not differentiate the funds which are "liberated" by this means depending on the order of birth of a child in the family, a simple computation convinces us that it becomes possible to increase the amount of the grant for partially paid leave of absence by 20 rubles a month, i.e., to pay 55 rubles instead of 35. However, in order to realize the priority of the necessary demographic changes, it would be expedient to differentiate the amount of the grant depending on the order of birth of the children (Table 2).

Table 2

Order of birth of child	Duration of leave, months		Amount of monthly grant, rubles	
	partially paid	without continued material support		
First	10	6	40	
Second	16	6	60	
Third	16	6	80	
Fourth and each subsequent	16	6	40	

No additional funds would be needed for introducing grants in this amount.

Considering the state of affairs with labor resources to the year 1995, we should not prolong the partially paid leave of absence for the birth of the first child, but rather should retain it at the current level. Subsequently, as capacities are expanded, we will be able to increase the length of the leave for birth of the first child and increase by 20-30 rubles the amount of all monthly grants. However, here it is necessary to study the possibilities for expanding the temporal limits determining eligibility for receiving the grants. Specialists believe that prolonging the interruption in work to 3 years inevitably hurts the possibilities of the woman's professional growth and job advancement. A certain increase in the time of the leave, of course, is necessary. However, in order to create optimal conditions for raising children and for the woman's realization of her capacities in social production, it is necessary to further develop the entire social sphere—to increase the numbers and improve the quality of work of children's nursery schools and kindergartens, public health institutions, and consumer services.

#### **FOOTNOTES**

- 1. Moreover, grants are paid for handicapped children, for children of persons on urgent military service, for children during the period of search for their parents who have neglected their child support payments, and for the care of sick children. These grants are not analyzed in this article, as they are not directly associated with the problem under review.
- 2. The questionnaires filled out in Taganrog took into consideration the material aid of relatives given to young families, which is usually not defined in formulation of the grants.

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#### Supreme Court Chairman Interviewed on Judicial Reforms

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[Interview with Vladimir Ivanovich Terebilov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, conducted by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA commentator Aleksandr Borin: "Morality and the Law": "What We Expect From Judicial Reform"]

[Text]

#### The Pyramid

[Borin] Vladimir Ivanovich, I would like to begin our conversation by asking about so-called judicial errors. Unfortunately, this refers not just to isolated instances, but rather to quite a widespread phenomenon. An individual is arrested and spends years behind barbed wire before it is discovered that he was not guilty of anything, that an error was made. And that error was not caught by either the investigating organs or by the court, whose role was merely to rubber-stamp the charges brought against the individual. Of course, the easiest way to explain this would be to blame a low level of qualification on the part of jurists. But do the causes here perhaps go much deeper and are they perhaps much more serious, being rooted in

the shortcomings of the court system itself? Wi! the reform of our country's judicial system currently being prepared eliminate those shortcomings?

[Terebilov] The causes that you mentioned did not just appear today or yesterday. I think that to a significant degree they are the result of the metamorphosis which took place in our judicial system at the beginning of the 1930's. If one imagines the entire judicial system as being in the shape of a pyramid, then under normal conditions at the top of the pyramid should be courts whose word is decisive and final. However, at the beginning of the 1930's this pyramid was turned upside down, completely reversed, and priority was given to centralized and uncontrolled preliminary investigation. It developed that the court's main obligation when hearing criminal cases was not to consider the charges against an individual in an independent manner, but instead merely to decide on the severity of the sentence. Acquittal or submission of the case for further investigation were considered exceptional events. A verdict of guilty was handed down in 99 percent of all criminal cases. And that is the principal reason not only for the numerous errors that you mentioned, but also instances of outright arbitrariness and crimes against justice. Since 1953 this situation has been rectified to a great extent. However, undervaluation of the courts and court control persist to this day. Thus, if I had to say in a couple of words what needs to be done to begin basic judicial reform right now, I would put it this way: the "pyramid" needs to be returned to its normal position.

[Borin] But, obviously, the unnatural position of the "pyramid" was a means to some end, was it not? It is easier to dictate to preliminary investigative organs than to the courts; the former are, so to speak, more obedient and manageable, true?

[Terebilov] As a rule the courts handle a case openly and publicly; therefore it is of course more difficult to influence them than it would be to influence organizations in which everything is decided behind closed doors. Concentrating pretrial as well as de facto trial authority in one set of hands gave one a free rein... However, despite all the glasnost associated with court procedures pressure on judicial organs is unfortunately not just something which happened in the past; to a certain extent it is also a problem today. Consider this: the Constitution of the USSR states that the courts are independent and subordinate only to the law. However, it seems to me that this legal statute of the Soviet Constitution definitely needs to be amended with real guarantees of that independence. For instance, it would be good to decree that judges be elected to longer terms than is currently the case, or perhaps for life. It would be very important if the Constitution of the USSR would note that the independence of judges is guaranteed by a special law which punishes lack of respect for courts and efforts to influence them.

[Borin] Quite frankly, I cannot imagine what effect such a law would have. Because pressure is usually not exerted on a court in public view, but instead secretly, behind closed doors. A telephone call, a confidential conversation in some important office, a "high-level" opinion relayed to a judge... Can such non-judicial actions as these be stopped by judicial means?

[Terebilov] There is some truth in what you are saying. But you are obviously underestimating the very fact of the existence of such a law, if, of course, it were passed. Its very existence would make many people stop and think about what their attitude toward courts should be. It is one thing to force your opinion on a judge either face-to-face or over the telephone, ignoring general principles, and quite another to realize that you are committing an action which carries a specific penalty.

[Borin] A criminal penalty?

[Terebilov] Even a criminal penalty.

[Borin] But can you imagine a court ever putting a raykom secretary on trial, for instance? Is that realistic?

[Terebilov] At the present time perhaps not, but as a result of restructuring it should become realistic. I assume that further democratization of our society cannot fail to affect the party apparatus as well. The party must not perform its guiding role by directive/command methods, not "over the phone," but instead through those communists who hold various positions in the economy and in the state apparatus. Well, and also in the courts, of course. Those people should implement the party line and a partylike approach. A judge's duty as a party member is to uphold the law unfailingly.

[Borin] But what if on the scales we have the law on the one side, and a directive, a command or the "advice" of a local party leader on the other? And what if a judge is very subtly reminded that "first and foremost you are a communist, dear comrade"?

[Terebilov] Anyone who would do such a thing is himself a very poor communist.

[Borin] Yes, of course. But does it not seem to you, Vladimir Ivanovich, that it is much easier for the chairman of the USSR Supreme Court to talk like that than it would be for an ordinary local judge to be guided that in practice?

[Terebilov] Absolutely. That is why I am so persistent about bringing up the need for real guarantees of judicial independence as the main feature of restructuring of our system of justice. Currently it is not very difficult for a responsible party or soviet administrator to get a troublesome, "disobedient" judge recalled. There are quite a few examples where that has happened. Therefore the task is to protect judges from the arbitrary decisions of local administrators. How can this be done in practical

terms? There are several ways to do this. But right now I would like to discuss just one of them. I feel that the USSR Supreme Court and the republic supreme courts could establish authoritative, qualified councils (or appeals committees). If there were complaints concerning a judge, or if questions were raised concerning his incompetence or recall, then it would not be the local leadership, sometimes involved and with a personal bias, which would resolve such matters, but instead an objective and authoritative council.

[Borin] As I understand, in addition to the problem of judges' independence there is also the problem of their immunity. I recently wrote in LITERATURNAYA GAZETA about how members of the militia and procurators take revenge on troublesome judges. And this is what is sad: today it is possible to influence a judge and in fact blackmail him without even violating the letter of the law. Permission from a republic Supreme Soviet Presidium is needed only to put a judge on trial; searches of his home, interrogations and face-to-face confrontations with accusers can be conducted without such permission.

[Terebilov] This section of the law is badly formulated and needs to be refined. It does occur that this fact is exploited by some investigators and procurators, and this is absolutely intolerable. It seems to me essential that we establish a special procedure for which, unfortunately, no provision is made in the law today: removal from office. If the appeals council which we mentioned before were convinced that the complaints made against a judge were justified, then that judge would be officially removed from office. And only then would it be possible to call the ex-judge in for questioning, indict him, etc. Until a judge is removed from office he would have immunity.

[Borin] And how should this impeachment procedure be conducted? Behind closed doors, or openly and publicly?

[Terebilov] Publicly, I think, but the specific forms must of course be discussed and considered thoroughly. It is important that all democratic principles be strictly observed in this matter.

[Borin] Is it perhaps time to consider thoroughly not only the procedure for removing a judge, but also the procedure for placing him in office? Has not the system for electing judges — at least in its present form — become outdated? For, quite frankly, it is not so much democracy as an illusion of democracy, as formalized a measure as checking off a list. Would it not be more reasonable to appoint a people's judge by a decree of the republic Supreme Soviet Presidium?

[Terebilov] That would probably be expedient. But if one were to propose this, people would say: "The conservative — he is opposed to democratic secret balloting."

[Borin] I think that they would not say that, because we have already endured too much as the result of sham democracy which has very often been used as camouflage behind which overt command methods have flourished.

#### "I Still Would Let Him Go..."

[Borin] Let us assume that the Constitution of the USSR has been amended to include specific guarantees of judicial independence and that a law has been passed establishing penalties for failure to respect the courts. Would the tendency toward guilty verdicts in the court system that is so often written about in the papers today disappear?

[Terebilov] Do you mean, is it only external factors which sometimes force a judge to choose a guilty verdict over a verdict of not guilty? No, not entirely. Much depends on the judge's experience, qualifications, moral qualities, adherence to principle, firmness of character... For example, we know that any doubt should be interpreted in favor of the accused. Of course, almost no one will dispute that openly. But sometimes a judge thinks to himself: "O.K., you acquit him, my friend, and then he goes out and kills somebody else or steals again, and people are going to say to you: you could have kept this new crime from happening." Or he thinks like this: in this specific case it is true that the evidence is thin, but it is obvious to everyone that the defendant is a potential criminal; it is dangerous to let him run around loose, a tragedy could occur... What decision should a judge make, what choice? Which is more humane: following the letter of the law and releasing the individual, or convincing oneself that the interests of society justify ignoring the letter of the law?

[Borin] What would you, as a judge, do?

[Terebilov] I would let him go. And then I would wait and see whether you would write an article saying that, well, maybe formally I acted correctly, but that as a result of that action a new crime was committed.

[Borin] I would not write that article, because I am too well aware of the cost to people and to society when the rights of the individual are violated "just a little bit" in the name of their supposed interests.

[Terebilov] Of course, from the vantage point of my lifetime of experience and official position it is easy to reason this way. But put yourself in the place of a young judge, new to the bench. What is it like for him to face that decision each time and to take all the flak for his decision?

[Borin] Remember what Herzen said: "It is much better for a clever thief to go unpunished than it is for every honest person to tremble like a thief in his own room." [Terebilov] Yes. And I am in complete agreement with that idea. But if tomorrow that clever thief who was acquitted for lack of evidence were to rob your apartment, what would you say? The profession of a judge is a difficult one, oh, so difficult...

[Borin] And yet, if there were a doubt, would you still interpret that doubt in favor of the accused and let him go?

[Terebilov] Yes, I would still let him go. It is better for two guilty persons to escape punishment than it is for one innocent person to be punished unjustly.

[Borin] Vladimir Ivanovich, it seems to me that the normal functioning of the court is also hampered by another circumstance. A judge knows that if he hands down an acquittal or returns a case for additional investigation, then the investigator who handled that case will be in hot water. He will be accused of doing poor work and will be hounded at every turn; in short, a disaster! As a result, relations between the procuracy and the court worsen, causing disputes and strife. Is that right? Of course, if an investigator was in flagrant violation of the law, falsified documents, concealed or altered facts, then that would be intolerable. But there could also be a different situation: suppose the investigator honestly assumed that an individual was guilty and attempted to prove it, yet the court did not agree with his conclusion after studying the evidence. Is there any need to make a tragedy, a catastrophe, out of that every time, excoriating and hounding the investigator?

[Terebilov] I think that this unhealthy attitude toward acquittals came about in the era when the investigation was supposed to decide everything and the court merely rubber-stamped its decision. And now, when courts have begun to break out of the limited role assigned to them, some investigators and procurators regard this as some sort of mortal insult. However, I feel that cases where in a difficult situation an investigator submits a case to the court and the court, after weighing and investigating the evidence, decides that it does not concur with the investigator's evaluation and conclusions, are quite possible and natural. Of course that is not a tragedy. That is a natural process of the legal system.

[Borin] What is your attitude toward jury trials?

[Terebilov] I feel that today they have little value.

[Borin] Why?

[Terebilov] Life has become more complicated, crimes have become more complicated, judicial affairs have become more complicated. And when resolving the principal question, that of whether the accused is guilty or not, it is not enough for a judge to be merely an honest person. He must also have a broad range of knowledge and a wealth of experience in life and in the judiciary. A juror is not trained to do that kind of work. Incidentally,

foreign countries have also made significant changes in the traditional system of trial by jury. Most often the judge does not remain in the courtroom, but instead accompanies the jurors into the jury room. He does not vote with them, but he advises them and provides them with necessary clarifications, and many cases are handled by judges alone. In other words, our institution of people's assessors is in conception better than the institution of jurors. But we are putting our institution into practice poorly, if not badly.

[Borin] Have there been proposals that the number of people's assessors be increased?

[Terebilov] Well, in particularly difficult cases, for instance, we could bring in four people's assessors instead of two. But not because we do not trust the judges, but simply due to the fact that the more life experience is available, the better. This helps the judge overcome his own doubts and vacillation...

[Borin] What changes would you recommend in the functioning of appellate and supervisory authorities? Because they are the ones who provide the principal barrier against judicial errors.

[Terebilov] I think that the principal barrier against judicial errors should be lower court. Multiplicity of authorities is far from a panacea. However, I feel that it would serve a purpose to grant supervisory courts greater rights than they currently have. Presently in order to correct a more or less serious error we have to return the case to the lower court. Then the whole procedure is repeated, time passes, meanwhile people may still be in custody... I think that in the interests of justice and the interests of people we need to grant the supervisory court itself the right to correct errors committed by lower courts in cases where that becomes necessary.

[Borin] And if necessary subpoena witnesses in the trial to appear at its own sessions?

[Terebilov] Yes, if necessary, also to subpoena needed witnesses.

#### Free Until the Trial

[Borin] Unfortunately, the practice of a person being held in custody for months and even years prior to trial and during preliminary investigation has become widespread. Is this a normal situation?

[Terebilov] It is not only abnormal, but also illegal. This is also one of the bad holdovers from past years. It is permissible to imprison a person prior to trial only in those cases where a person could flee or commit a new crime, or when a special situation mandates the taking of special, extraordinary measures. As a rule, prior to trial and a guilty verdict a person should remain at liberty. But what do some investigators do? First they arrest a

person and only then do they begin an active investigation. They simplify their task by ignoring basic legal principles contained in the Constitution of the USSR.

[Borin] Could this vicious practice perhaps be stopped by court control?

[Terebilov] It is above all the Soviet Constitution which should stop this vicious practice, and I am sure that in the end that will be the case. Court control? Yes, some scientists and journalists propose that the courts themselves be the ones to sanction arrests prior to trial. Perhaps the direction of such thinking is correct. But I would prefer a different system: in cases of necessity arrest orders would be issued by the procurator, but after the suspect had been held in custody for, say, six months the investigative organs would ask for court permission to extend custody, and the court would hand down an immediate ruling on the matter.

[Borin] But this would not be an unlimited extension, would it?

[Terebilov] No, of course not. An extension of two or three months.

[Borin] And then? Say the case is set to go to trial and a court date is set. But probably not soon, considering the large case load. Will the individual in question remain in jail? Because now no formal limits on custody are being violated, since the individual under arrest is no longer under the jurisdiction of the procuracy, but rather that of the court. But what does that matter to the person serving the time? Prison is prison.

[Terebilov] There is a two-month time limit within which courts are obligated to hear the cases they receive. But you are correct, sometimes this limit is not adhered to. Should we require that the courts always, in every case, begin hearing a case within two months? Will this not cause damaging haste with regard to complicated cases that fill many volumes, and will not the result be even more judicial errors? One high-level jurist in Ireland told me that under their laws he could declare: "I will hear this case six months from now. I need time to think and to read the law and specialized literature."

[Borin] Does that mean that there is no solution? That the person in custody has to just wait in his jail cell until his judge is ready?

[Terebilov] The solution is the same as always: stay within the time limit established by law and, most importantly, take as few people as possible into custody prior to trial. And, incidentally, if the court were the one to decide, as we have discussed, whether to continue holding someone in custody or not, then there would be fewer persons held in custody under the court's jurisdiction.

[Borin] Oh, Vladimir Ivanovich, I am afraid that courts will be too timid to exercise this right. I say that because I have seen how timidly and unwillingly judges have been to revoke arrest orders for the prevention of evasion when they send a case back to be investigated. As a rule, they do not waive them.

[Terebilov] Ask yourself why that is the case.

[Borin] Because they do not want to jeopardize their relations with the procuracy?

[Terebilov] That is my thinking, too. But if you tell judges that, many of them reply: "What, are you accusing us of cowardice? What grounds do you have for that?" And, indeed, very often the courts simply have no possibility of revoking arrest orders for the prevention of evasion. Say an individual is accused of five murders. Two of them have not been proven, so additional investigation is required. Well, should that person be set free while the investigation is in progress? Or say a person is accused of embezzling 100,000 rubles. Expert opinions are required repeatedly. Should the person be released while those opinions are sought? And what if he flees? Nevertheless, it would probably be good for the court to set a specific time limit on custody of the suspect when sending a case back for additional investigation.

[Borin] Is there any chance that this system will be adopted?

[Terebilov] I am afraid that our two votes will not suffice for that. Some investigators would probably be bitterly opposed to it. And that is understandable: the main weight of the fight against crime at its initial, most acute stage falls on their shoulders.

[Borin] But not at the expense of violating constitutional principles?

[Terebilov] No, not at that expense.

[Borin] Now I would like to talk about criminal penalties. In this area as well quite a few problems have accumulated, and they require solutions.

[Terebilov] Absolutely. But I think that that subject is too broad and complex, and will require an interview to itself. Therefore let us limit our discussion to a few short comments. Firstly, it would seem appropriate to me that new criminal legislation should include only maximum penalties; minimum penalties should not be listed, they could be left to the discretion of the court. In this way courts could hand down sentences which would take the defendant's personality and the circumstances of the case into account to a greater extent. I also propose that courts set the punishment regime only for the first six months or a year. From that point on special commissions comprised of members of the local soviet, the administration, the procuracy, a physician, a psychologist, etc., operating at places of detention could take

over. These commissions would, on the basis of specific data, decide whether to keep the prisoner under the previously established regime or whether it would be more appropriate to grant him certain privileges and greater freedom. And, finally, greater variation and differentiation should be introduced into the system of penal regimes. Some people only understand strictness and harsh measures; others could, on the contrary, be broken by excessive strictness. Individualization of punishment is one of the main approaches to prisoner reeducation. I would like to stress that over the past two or three years courts have begun handing down fewer prison sentences. This is a correct tendency. However, we must ensure that it does not cause a rash of recidivism.

#### Constitutional Review

[Borin] Up until now we have been talking about problems which have previously accumulated in judicial practice. However, restructuring of the judicial system will obviously also expand the realm of judicial activity. In the press it has already been proposed that courts be given the right of constitutional review. What is your opinion on this issue, and what form do you think that such review could take?

[Terebilov] I propose that in a socialist state governed by law it would be good to assign courts some functions of constitutional review. For instance, if in the course of a specific case the court discovered that the person was in fact being accused not of a violation of the law, but rather of a violation of some standardizing act (a ministerial order, an instruction, a resolution) which was itself illegal because it is in violation of the Constitution of the USSR or other basic legislation. The court would acquit that person, but it could not declare the act in question illegal, i.e. it could not eliminate the source of that type of case. Today the court does not have that right. I think it is essential that this right be granted to the USSR Supreme Court, as well as to the supreme courts of union and autonomous republics and to kray and oblast courts.

[Borin] But cannot the procurator currently protest an illegal act?

[Terebilov] Yes, he can. But what if the ministry or department in question does not agree with the procurator's protest? The law does not provide a clear-cut answer to this question. True, recently the procurator was granted the right to halt the functioning of some illegal acts. Well, what now? Half-measures are insufficient. I propose that the procurator should have to present his statement declaring an act illegal to a court, and then the court would decide if that declaration were justified and would if necessary issue a resolution declaring the act to be in violation of the law.

[Borin] Would the procurator be the only on who could petition the court?

[Terebilov] No. That right should be granted to all-union and republic organs of power and administration, ministries, departments and major public organizations—the AUCCTU, the Soviet Women's Committee, the Union of Writers, etc.

[Borin] What is the highest level of standardizing acts that could be protested? Say for instance that the Government of the USSR passed an illegal resolution. Can you theoretically envision that?

[Terebilov] I have been envisioning that theoretically for a long time. But in practical terms today, in this era of restructuring, this is what I think: if we have a state governed by law then, probably, the USSR Supreme Court could and should be granted the right to evaluate the legality even of government resolutions in certain cases.

[Borin] Assume that there were a dispute between union republics. Could the USSR Supreme Court hear the case?

[Terebilov] Yes, I think so. If the matter were of a legal rather than a political nature.

[Borin] Vladimir Ivanovich, recently a law was passed concerning protests through the court system against illegal actions by officials. It seems to me that that law was published in a truncated form. The great majority of administrative decisions are made by collective bodies, yet in that case citizens do not have a right to take their case to court. Is that fair?

[Terebilov] I am a judge, and therefore I must carry out the law, not critique it. But if you want to know about possible improvement of this law, I would suggest that it would be possible to expand the court's jurisdiction and grant courts the right to hear suits concerning the illegality of certain collective decisions.

[Borin] We have always said, and we continue to say, that the theory of "separation of powers" — into legislative, executive and judicial branches — is unacceptable under socialist conditions. But can socialist democracy ignore the best democratic institutions developed by humanity over the centuries?

[Terebilov] This question does indeed exist, and I think that it should be developed and resolved. It seems to me that we cannot blindly transplant the attributes of bourgeois society into our lives. The Constitution of the USSR clearly states that the Communist Party is the leading and guiding force in Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system. Perhaps we could talk about a structure like this: legislative, executive and judicial organs would perform their own, strictly defined, specific functions without duplicating one another or usurping the powers of each other; the party would handle the political coordination of all these forms of power. Or, to put it a different way: political

tasks are the same for all of society, and they would be set by the party. However, each of the "powers" would perform those tasks falling within the limits and framework of its jurisdiction. And if the country's highest judicial organ were to make a decision within its jurisdiction, then that decision would be binding and neither the legislative nor the executive power could revoke it. This situation would be in accordance with the principles of a state governed by law, and therefore with the development of socialist democracy as well. Basically, I think it is essential to put it this way: more socialism means more legal guarantees which will protect socialism and protect the functioning of all forms of socialist democracy.

[Borin] There are a whole series of urgent, timely questions in addition to these. For example, questions on the trials of the 1930's through the 1950's, on certain present-day matters, on the first results of restructuring of judicial affairs, and so on. I hope that I will have another opportunity to pose them to you.

[Terebilov] Of course, I would be eager to hear them. If the editors of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA will grant us some valuable space in their paper, we can continue our dialogue. Especially since these problems will, I believe, be the subject of discussion at the 19th Party Conference.

12825

Health Official Interviewed on Reform of Psychiatric Practice

18000326 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Apr 88 p 6

[Interview with A.Churkin, USSR Ministry of Health Chief Psychiatrist, by special correspondent E.Maksimova: "First Changes in Psychiatric Care;" first paragraph a boldface introduction]

[Text] Last year, many newspapers, including IZVESTIYA, devoted their space to discussions of problems of psychiatric care, its legal regulations and protection and guarantees of human rights. Three months ago the USSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium passed the law approving the Regulations of Conditions and Processes of Providing Psychiatric Care. Our special correspondent E.Maksimova asked the USSR Ministry of Health's Chief Psychiatrist A.Churkin to discuss changes that are taking place in this area.

[Question] To begin with, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, I would like to quote one of the administrators of Moscow psychiatric care, who I think correctly summed up the current situation: "Psychiatric care is going through hard times. Its task is to break existing stereotypes, to correct errors, to rehabilitate itself in the eyes of the society and to start in a new direction." The new law identified that

direction: it is democracy, socialist legality, humanism and mercy. Too little time has passed since then, but apparently there have been some changes already, isn't it so?

[Answer] First of all, we have felt immediately that the question of expertise has been taking up more of our time. The Ministry of Health sets up more frequently than in the past its own commissions to review controversial cases: whether or not the diagnosis is correct or whether or not institutionalization is warranted. The workload of chief psychiatrists of cities, oblasts and republics has increased sharply. This is a new position with extremely important diagnostic and control responsibilities. Incidentally, these positions require such high professional and civil qualifications that many are still vacant, since we can not find qualified candidates. The review of controversial cases will be taking up the lion's share of chief psychiatrists' time for another couple of years, until we have lived down the legacy of the past.

[Question] Have there been instances of a chief psychiatrist's decision being contested in court, as it is permitted under the new law?

[Answer] I do not know. I do not think there have been any yet, simply because the law have been in force only since March 1.

There is another result of reform in Moscow: now there are vacant beds in psychiatric hospitals.

[Question] This is a telling fact. How do you explain it?

[Answer] We have been using emergency institutionalization less frequently. Psychiatrists have become very careful about placing patients into institutions, especially against the patient will. The duration of institutionalization has gotten shorter, too. If relatives insist, and if the patient does not present a danger to the society, he is released even if for his own good he should have stayed longer.

[Question] Had psychiatrists been trusted more, their views would have seemed more persuasive... Has the experiment being conducted in Moscow, Leningrad, Latvia, Ivanovo Oblast and Altay Kray brought any results yet?

[Answer] To remind the readers, the experiment concerns monitoring and registering patients on an outpatient basis. It stems from the Ministry's determination to reform the substance of psychiatric clinics' work. They were created to aid patients but have became scarecrows that actually impede treatment. The reorganization of the way patients are being registered and a fundamentally new approach to the process are meant to break the stereotypes that the society has formed about them. We expect the number of registered patients to be cut by a third. There is, however, one troubling aspect. Many

psychiatrists are wary of taking patients off the list, fearing for their own future. What if something happens to the former patient? The psychiatrist will have to shoulder the responsibility.

[Question] Can the psychiatrist's doubt be a result of inadequate professional training?

[Answer] It is true, at clinics that are staffed by old experienced psychiatrists doubts are fewer. Yet, even profound knowledge and high professional standards would not protect a psychiatrist from criminal charges if 10 or 15 years from now a patient of his got into trouble. But who can give a 100 percent guarantee? Demanding a humane attitude from its psychiatrists the society, or its law enforcing agencies, must in turn be humane toward them.

In general, fewer patients have been coming to psychiatric clinics, even though we have been more careful about registering them. I think this happens because many regular outpatient clinics have begun providing psychiatric services and psychiatric counseling is now available at workplace. Moreover, many psychiatrists now practice privately, with a license, and people prefer this type of treatment. Good for them. The more they know about psychiatry, the less suspicious they are of psychiatrists

[Question] People avoid clinics also because they fear professional and civil restrictions that are placed on registered patients.

[Answer] Here much will change too. Our marching orders are to deprive psychiatric patients as little as possible of their right to live fully in the society. We intend to reevaluate various professional restrictions and bans on driving, foreign travel, etc. Here, however, we have already run into resistance from the All-Union Central Trade Union Council; they categorically object to granting psychiatric patients admission to regular sanatoriums. A neurotic person, it turns out, has no right to treat his ulcer. And yet, for a majority of our patients their illness does not manifest itself openly and does not preclude normal interaction with others.

[Question] After the law's publication the Ministry had to change its regulations. Has this been done?

[Answer] New regulations have been drafted and approved by the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor's Office and the USSR MVD; preliminary drafts have been sent out to the nation's psychiatric clinics where they will be discussed for a full year not only by psychiatrists but by everyone who wants to. Everything that used to be filed under the heading For Official Use Only, or concealed from outsiders without any heading, every rule that regulates our daily activities, the relationship between the psychiatrist and the patient and their rights and responsibilities — all this is now in

the open. The psychiatrist no longer can reply to the patient or to his relatives: "Such are the rules." They now can request to see those rules, which will have to be shown to them.

[Question] Let us return to the regulations, especially to those which detail the most touchy subject socially, namely emergency care administered without the patient's consent.

[Answer] Before the clinic is allowed to administer such care, it has to have a request detailing all the reasons why it is needed. Chief medical administrator must conscientiously examine the request. However, his opinion alone is ir ficient. The final decision rests with chief psychiatris.. I would like to point out to police officers—since they are most frequently the originators of such requests—that they should be very careful. Behavior that does not fit accepted norms is not necessarily symptomatic of mental illness. From now on clinics not only will refuse to respond to such irresponsible exercises in amateur psychiatry but will seek to put an end to them.

[Question] Mandatory treatment, says the law, can be administered also if the patient presents an immediate danger to himself and to others. This is the principal, and the only, reason for emergency institutionalization. What is contained in these regulations?

[Answer] We have collected there all the most common clinical symptoms. There are, of course, signs of danger that even a lay person could discern and sound alarm. However, it should be kept in mind that clear danger is not necessarily the result of mental illness. And the opposite is also true: the state of agitation does not necessarily lead to a tragedy. It may also happen that a patient, even if he is delirious or depressed, does not present a danger at that particular moment; yet, the psychiatrist's experience suggests that in 12 hours or in a day there will be a crisis. Yet, relative may object to institutionalization.

[Question] The cause of this is the same, and the solution is also the same: the rehabilitation of psychiatry in the eyes of the ill as well as the healthy.

[Answer] Yet, of course... It is very difficult to formulate the criteria of risk to the society. We have recently discussed this with American psychiatrists, and they do not have a clear understanding of this either. We have decided to hold a joint seminar on this subject, and on another one, too: how to organize emergency intervention, the technology of it, the treatment and the conditions of release. The goal is to reach the most rational and legal compromise between the rights of the patient and the right of the society to defend itself against his dangerous actions.

[Question] I have another question for you, this one concerning litigious behavior. In the past, it could be the basis for forcible institutionalization.

[Answer] No, no. The new regulations specifically state that litigious behavior stemming from psychological and nervous disorders can no longer be considered the basis for institutionalization.

[Question] How to distinguish a normal person stubbornly pursuing an organization with stereotypical letters from a person with a psychological disorder?

[Answer] There is no need to distinguish them. An ill person has the same right to defend his interests as a healthy person. Should they be listened to or not is the decision of the officials in charge, no matter what it is all about: be it the question of residence, of punishment for a bureaucrat or of some everyday troubles. This has nothing to do with psychiatry.

[Question] And yet in the past, employees of various publications, including unfortunately IZVESTIYA, quite often sought advice of psychiatric clinics on the necessity of continuing correspondence with some individuals. This was done with the permission of then chief psychiatrist of Moscow.

[Answer] This, incidentally, was a violation of the citizens' constitutional rights. There is a law safeguarding medical information: a diagnosis concerning a person's mental health can be given out only to the police and court authorities. What does it mean, correspondence is unnecessary? A person can be adjudged incapable only by the court. Such patients are very few in number, there is less than a full percentage point of them, So no matter how you look at it, correspondence with the ill and the healthy is subject to the same regulations.

12892

Young People Debate Komsomol's Unique Status Among Youth Groups

18000327a Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 21 Apr 88 p 2

[Report by staff correspondents V. Kiyanitsa and O. Usenkov of a discussion held at Alma-Ata Secondary School No 56, under the rubric "Komsomol Council": "The Komsomol Is Us!"]

[Text] Alma-Ata—This discussion took place in Alma-Ata Secondary School No 56. Its participants were ninth-and tenth-graders.

Participants in the discussion were divided into two groups.

One group worked out a model in which the present structure of the Komsomol undergoes radical reforms. And the other group worked out a model whereby the Komsomol becomes first among equals or, simply, an equal among other young people's organizations.

It may be that the discussion did not produce any special revelations. But there were ideas and controversial viewpoints, and there were specific proposals for the plenum of the Central Committee of the All- Union Leninist Komsomol. There was, finally, a lively interest on the part of the youngsters themselves, and that was also an important result of the discussion.

Everyone without exception believed that the Komsomol, which means all of us, still must demonstrate and demonstrate again its right to a leading, vanguard role.

The discussion was conducted by Ye. I. Sosedova, teacher of history and social sciences and leader of the Sobesednik political club.

On the eve of the discussion the school's Sobesednik political club distributed a questionnaire. Here are the most characteristic answers:

"RESTRUCTURING IS: the breaking up of the bureaucratic apparatus; a revolution in everything; when attention is paid to Western economics; when everyone restructures himself according to his own taste; a radical change in attitudes; the destruction of unsuitable methods of management; the influx of young people into the management sphere; equality among people (which does not yet exist in our country)."

"DEMOCRACY IS: the full rights of citizens, when there is complete freedom, but that cannot exist; equal participation in management; not doing what you don't want to do, and doing what you want; freedom for everyone who has his own position in life."

"GLASNOST IS: sometimes speaking and writing about everything without fear, for everyone about everything; when facts, and not someone's opinion, are reported; freedom of information, freedom of thought, genuine freedom of speech, freedom of the press and freedom to demonstrate; real freedom to speak out."

"SOCIAL JUSTICE IS: real equal opportunity for all people, when everyone receives as much as he is supposed to receive; when all social strata are equal, regardless of whether you are a member of the Central Committee or something like that."

WHAT NEGATIVE PHENOMENA IN OUR LIFE HAVE YOU YOURSELF ENCOUNTERED? "Favoritism, mutual protectionism, the degrading—usually psychologically, but sometimes also physically—of the

weak, drug abuse, indifference, the exceeding of authority by officials and their children, injustice in the allocation of apartments, nationalism, the infringement of civil rights."

THE PERSON YOU REVERE? "Only Lenin remains, and Krushchev (with reservations), and, of course, M. S. Gorbachev; my father; V. S. Vysotskiy; my mother; S. Yesenin; Paul McCarthy; Julius Ceasar."

We are responsible for our organization.—That is the conclusion of a heated and difficult discussion.

#### From the minutes:

"In my opinion, the Komsomol should become either a young people's section of the party or an independent organization. The way it is now pleases no one. It should be something like a shock-absorber for us. It should mitigate the conditions of the times. But as it is, if there's any sort of stagnation, you immediately hear: 'Forward, Komsomol!'"

"Aha, to have it your way, the Komsomol is like another party, and the party is the political organization of a class. And we young people are an age-group stratum."

"So what's the situation now? We aren't supposed to have our own interests?"

"All the same, the Komsomol is a political organization—the fist one we encounter."

"What about the Young Pioneers?"

"Well I think, in general, that children up to age 14 ought to be shielded from any sort of organizations. And not spoil their childhood!"

"We're all talking about the wrong thing. The party arose when the historical necessity for it arose, and it exists by virtue of historical necessity. Because it has a great purpose. But does the Komsomol, at present, have such a purpose? What is it, discoteques and volunteer work days? Vague objectives of the sort: 'bring up in the spirit,' or 'prepare a reserve'?' These are the objectives of an intermediary. But where are the Komsomol's own objectives? Do they exist?"

"They do. Take a look. The school teaches us mathematics, physics and geography. We're taught at home, too. On the streets, we have our own business. But there ought to be someone or something that instills civic spirit, patriotism and internationalism in us and brings us up politically. As it is, we are presently a lost generation."

"Incidentally, we have been lost by that very Komsomol."

"No one has lost us. You yourself choose your position. The Komsomol should be the sort of organization that helps you choose your position— and that's all."

"It sometimes seems to me that all this noise—oh, leisure, recreation, discotheques—is advantageous to someome, so that we don't think about anything else."

"Wait. That's all natural, because the Komsomol right now is one form of the administrative management of young people. And it no longer has any interest in anything of the sort. We all say 'Komsomol,' but in reality there are two. Us, the schoolchildren and young people, and them, the apparatus, the functionaries and bureaucrats, in general. That's why it all turns out that way."

"Once again, 'us' and 'them.' As though the functionaries and bureaucrats were not chosen from among us, but were dispatched to us."

"And in general, let them set up a bunch of young people's organizations now, but we're in this one! What are we supposed to do now, desert? The Komsomol is our party."

All the participants in the discussion agreed that the Komsomol is necessary as a sociopolitical organization. What should it be like?

The 'reformists' believe:

"In the first place, our group proceeds from the premise that the Komsomol is necessary as an organization. If only in order to keep young people from continuing to be spoiled the way we have been.

"We propose not to change its structure radically. We believe that, in general, all the Komsomol's problems come down to how to enhance its activeness. We resolved this issue through specific deeds, because precisely what the Komsomol lacks is deeds. If there are deeds, there will be prestige. So, it's like this: if the organization starts concerning itself with deeds, the old structure will be suitable, too. We introduce only the term 'specialization of the primary organization.' The entire Komsomol would be broken down into groups and detachments, each of which would concern itself with a specific matter. Then the sort of thing that was spoken of at the 20th Congress of the All-Union Leninist Komsomol—that Komsomol organizations 'have come to resemble one another like twins, with identical plans, identical activities, identical meeting agendas, and even identical shortcomings'-would no longer exist.

"The basis of the Komsomol should really be the primary organizations, and their members should be of diverse ages: Young Pioneers, older students, and teachers. Can it be normal that we have one Komsomol but two organizations in the schools? Here's another trivial matter we have forgotten: the school Komsomol undergoes a complete membership change every three to four years. What sort of strong traditions can there be in this case?"

The 'radicals' disagree:

"The Komsomol is accustomed to being the only representative of young people's interests. The absence of competition is corrupting. If it wants to preserve itself as a young people's organization, while restructuring itself today it must think that it is not the only one, otherwise it will never find a common language with those unofficial groups that have been mentioned. We believe that restructuring in the Komsomol must not be excluded from all restructuring in the country, and must not be divorced from the process of democratization we have spoken of. We propose setting up, on the basis of the Komsomol, a committee of young people's organizations, each of which would be created according to the interests of that organization's members. No matter what those interests might be-sports, cultural, etc. As it is, what we have now is that young people have no choice: either the Komsomol, or nothing. If he doesn't join the Komsomol, a person is excluded, as it were, from all public life. We believe that our idea eliminates the main obstacle--it eliminates the bureaucratic structure of the Komsomol. For organizations of that sort, it will simply not be needed. These organizations will clarify their own relations only by democratic means. Let them be some sort of negotiations or congresses, and young people will go only to those who are able to convince them that they can best represent their interests.

"And the Komsomol will provide guidance and coordination. And, in general, they all together will be one large Communist Youth League."

## For Presentation at a Plenum of the Central Committee of the All- Union Leninist Komsomol

We propose:

- I. That Komsomol organizations in the schools be set up not according to the principle of grade-based groups but according to the principle of detachments of members of diverse ages, whereby each would have a definite area of work and concern itself with a specific matter.
- 2. That Komsomol assignments be temporary and subject to regular change, whereby each activist would answer not only for an "area of work" (military patriotic work, mass cultural work, etc.) but for a specific undertaking, demonstrating his capability in it.
- 3. That conflict commissions made up of the schools most prestigeous Communists and Komsomol members be set up under school Komsomol committees to sort out conflicts between teachers and students.

#### Postscript to the Discussion

For all the controversial, absolutely contradictory points of view, and for all the failure of positions to be expressed fully and, possibly, clearly, this four-hour discussion was for the youngsters an attempt to recognize the Komsomol as a sociopolitical organization and themselves as members of precisely that sort of organization. An attempt, if you will, at political self-definition on their part.

At the end of the discussion more questions remained than answers had been found. But one thing was clear: the restoration of the Komsomol's sociopolitical status and prestige is possible only through these youngsters' attitudes, embodied in actual deeds. There is no other way.

8756

Attention of Komsomol Directed to Criminal Youth Gangs in Kazan

18000327b Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Apr 88 p 2

[Article by staff correspondent V. Kozin: "Pack: What Are the Causes of the Emergence of Criminal Teenage Gangs in Kazan?"; followed by comment by Andrey Frolov, first secretary of the Kazan City Komsomol Committee]

[Text] Kazan, Tatar ASSR—He took the can, which had been polished smooth by dozens of hands; it lay comfortably in his palm.

"Don't lag behind, Candle. Forward!" He heard a demanding cry, sharp as a whiplash, above his ear.

He ran off after the rest. An icy chill arose in his chest. He could feel the "supers," his comrades in "arms," wheezing alongside him, like driven horses. Someone started howling at the top of his lungs. The scream began to echo back and forth between the walls of the buildings on the narrow little street. Giving in to the general psychosis—his throat was instantaneously gripped by spasms—he too started screaming. He felt relief. His fear had gone somewhere. The outsiders started quavering.

The gangs or, as they are called here, "winders" have divided the city up into spheres of influence. Each gang has its own name and is formed according to a territorial principle—building, street, block or housing development.

He was given the nickname Candle for his extreme skinniness. He had moved to this rayon after the eighth grade. Once the fellows had stopped him at his entryway.

"Come to assembly tomorrow, at 6:00 p.m. Over there by that gazebo. Got it?" And here a vague hint followed: "Whoever isn't with us is against us."

Candle understood nothing. He forgot about the "assembly."

Two days later outside the bakery those same fellows took a ruble and change and a loaf of white bread away from him and snatched off his sports hat. He looked around dumfounded, standing by the wall, and wiped his smashed mouth with his sleeve.

"That's our last warning: today at six!"

Candle came.

About 20 people, all his peers, looked over the newcomer with interest. Three, who were a bit older, sat on a bench. Then the "interrogation" of one fellow began. Why had he missed assembly for three days? The fellow mumbled something about his parents and sickness. One of the older boys, without rising from the bench, kicked him. "Teach him!" he said through his teeth.

Every member of the gang went up to him and delivered a blow. The boy whimpered.

Not until he was back home did Candle realize what had been presented to him and the sort of object lesson he had been taught. He was dismayed: this was slavery!

In the evenings they would roam the housing development: they would beat up "outsiders" if the latter happened to accidently stray their way. Why, Candle did not know. He asked once. "The law," replied the head of the gang.

The program that someone's imperious hand had loaded in the "fear machine" was carried out unswervingly. The leaders had a great stake in keeping the gangs in a more or less stable state: that way it was easier to exploit the many "outcasts." Honor the "author" (from the word "authority"—V. K.), and in time you'll be somebody.

"We were told 'must,' and that was all," Candle squinted at the light penetrating the room through the dim prison window. "Whoever rebelled was brought into line. There could be only one excuse for missing an assembly—illness. They wouldn't take your word for it—you had to bring a doctor's note. There was an assembly every day."

"So it's impossible to quit the gang?"

"There are two ways out of us: either a penal colony, or the emergency room. I heard that other gangs have a buy-out tax: 250 'hazel hens."

The call log of the Kazan Internal Affairs Administration's duty unit contains almost daily "notes" on calls to gang fights. Over the course of a month there will be more than 100 notes.

Here is the opinion of Militia Col. V. Sukhanov, chief of the inspector department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs' Political Administration. "We have the impression that the Kazan militia still underestimates the seriousness of this phenomenon, seeing only the tip of the iceberg. Unfortunately, it is impossible to deny that the gangs are sometimes organized, rather than haphazard, in nature. As a rule, they are headed by real leaders with an established life "philosophy" that deviates from the norms of our laws and morality, and quite often genuine criminals—rapists, robbers—develop from the membership of these gangs."

From a report on incidents in the city of Kazan on 14 February:

"About 7:00 p.m. at building No 19, Bauman Street, a fight occurred between a gang of teenagers numbering 25-30 from Privolzhskiy Rayon and a gang numbering 14-15 from Leninskiy Rayon. As a result of the fight, the following persons were delivered to the research institute of traumatology and orthopedics: A. Starostin, born 1967, with a nonpenetrating knife wound to the thorax; S. Kudryavtsev, born 1970, with a hematoma in the parietal region; V. Tishchenko, born 1970, with a closed fracture of the left elbow...."

A. Avdeyev, deputy chief of the city internal affairs administration, has a "philosophical" view of this problem: "I don't think the events should be dramatized. There are not all that many of them—the 'winders' and the 'reels.' We have substantially more positive young people."

At least for the time being there are more of them.

As an analysis shows, in the past year alone the number of gangs in the city has doubled. According to the figures of the Tatar ASSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, there are now more than 60 of them. But according to the figures of Kazan State University's sociology laboratory (a survey was made of teenagers), there are about 100 gangs. One in every five young people from the ages of 12 to 18 is a member of a "reel."

In early autumn the "authors" undertook to collect a tax. (Candle, it's true, had to ask why again, in response to which, after a hard sock in the jaw, he received an exhaustive answer: "Fool, we have to take care of our own, to supply tea and cigarettes to those who are in the colony now. If you land there, we won't leave you without a present, either."

They would collect from three to 10 rubles every month. And sometimes even more often.

R. Kudyusov, a witness: "The laws of the gang are cruel. It has its own 'economy'—one of the main principles of its existence. A teenager who has landed in a gang

becomes a debtor. A great deal of money is collected. A big part of it—sometimes the sums are reckoned in five figures—lands in the pockets of the gang leaders."

From a report on incidents in Kazan on 18 February:

"I. Ismagilov, born 1971, was delivered to city hospital No 12 with a diagnosis of a penetrating knife wound to the thorax. According to the victim, the wound had been caused by four strangers."

"We armed ourselves," related Svecha. "In one of the courtyard gazebos we built up a store—canes, hockey sticks, steel rods. Many carried 'shivs' and steel balls on them.

"And then a consultant would come. We were taught how to dress for a fight so that witnesses would not recognize us—in identical uniforms— and were enlightened as to what an alibi was and how to prepare one in advance."

Most of the people with whom I met were in a state close to shock: how could this sort of thing happen? After all, it seemed that we had put an end to all this once and for all in the mid-1930s. Why have gang fights among teenagers suddenly been "ressurected" after four decades?

At the end of the 1970s in Kazan there was a noisy trial of the Tyap-lyap gang, which had terrorized the city for five years. Some people believe (and not without reason) that that is where the roots lie. I also heard another point of view in agencies of the Tatar ASSR Ministry of Internal Affairs: in the recent amnesty many criminal elements who had by no means embarked on a course of righteousness were freed. They are the ones who have become, if not heads of bandit gangs, at least the consultants, for sure.

From the report of incidents in Kazan on 28 February:

"Outside the central department store on Kirov Street unknown persons caused penetrating knife wounds to Gataullin, born 1969, and Khayrullin, born 1971, who died from the wounds he received."

Candle will soon "do time." Together with him in the defendant's dock will be another five or six people. They are the "stand-ins" or, more accurately, the "designated" (I don't know whether the "authors" put them up for a vote in deciding their fate. It's perfectly possible).

When an "author" tells a kid who is a minor: "Hit 'em. Don't be afraid. The law is on our side," he is not lying. Moreover, his promise that "they'll give you a reprieve" (a reprieve until the age of 18) is usually borne out. The lawyer will do everything he can to get one (and he will be right!).

Employees of the investigative agencies complain that, according to the logic of things, a criminal (a criminal is what he is) should earn his "reprieve" through a sincere confession, repentance, and good behavior, while in our country—we're humanists, after all!—everyone is treated the same (if you're not 18, you get a reprieve! A minor gets put on the books in the inspectorate for juvenile cases!). Because of this, we ourselves support and feed the confidence in them, the certainty that they can escape punishment.

Of course, the right of the decisive say is given to the court, and not to the investigator. But can it be that officers of the investigative agencies ought to be listened to, as well?

Here is one consideration—very widespread, incidentally, "among the people": Isn't it time to consider "children" who have received a passport to have reached the age of majority? It is from the age of 16 that they should answer for their actions according to our adult laws.

This is not a call for cruelty. A call for order, it is. And organizations with competence in matters of jurisprudence and law should probably think about that.

Several years ago the theory was very popular that this social ill would be successfully blocked and eliminated as soon as we satisfied young people's demand for "cultured intercourse" and "developed the industry" of recreation and sports.

There are seemingly enough recreation spots in the city, but the phenomenon remains.

According to data of Kazan State University's sociology laboratory, at the present time there are about 40 weakly linked agencies and organizations that work with young people. "The index (I quote from sociologists' methodological studies) of the effectiveness of their work consists of activities conducted in exemplary fashion with predetermined roles and functions and a rigid plan or scenario. In these activities teenagers have been given a purely passive role. Since the performance of empty rituals is not attractive to many young people, they, while remaining formally within the context of social institutions, actually remove themselves from their influence, creating their own forms of activity."

The school has been fighting as hard as it can for implementation of the reform—it is a lengthy process. Yet we do not yet have a school that plays an upbringing role. The reason appears to be the following: full-fledged work for schoolchildren, even work that is within the limits of their capabilities, is impossible in our day. Yes, to all intents and purposes our grown-up children are deprived of the right to work. The law diligently sees to it that they have nothing to do and are spared labor activity. And isn't this where all our woes come from, growing into enormous weeds?

The Komsomol. Here I once again want to turn to the methodological studies of the Kazan sociologists: "At the present time one can identify two main areas of the Komsomol's work in solving teenagers' problems:

- "1. The supporting of, as alternatives to gangs, young people's groups (the DDs—Dzerzhinskiy Detachments), which have arisen as forms of protecting teenagers against gangs. The city DD conference demonstrated numerous problems in the activities of these teenage organizations. They lack adequate authority and encounter misunderstanding on the part of school teachers, employees of cultural institutions, and even militia employees. But the most important problem is that, in resisting the gangs from a position of strength, the DDs lose the support of the majority of teenagers. In essence, they exist as an opposition to the gangs and have no activities with their own content.
- "2. The Komsomol makes attempts to enter into direct contact with teenagers and to redirect the gangs' activities into a socially acceptable context. But, as the experience of the failed 'open discussion' shows, for example, it has not yet been possible to interest the teenagers. They enter into contact with a rayon committee of the Komsomol only when they can use the Komsomol in some way: for example, to obtain the use of basements."

They pass before my eyes—such diverse youngsters: I talked with them in the offices of investigators and in investigation cells, in a colony and in a secondary vocational-technical school, in an ordinary school and in their homes. I look into their faces and I think: Is there a force than can stop and prevent another disaster?

#### In Lieu of an Afterword

The editors asked Andrey Frolov, first secretary of the Kazan City Komsomol Committee, to comment on this article:

"What, specifically, can we do? The first, and most important, thing is to find contact with the teenagers, and precisely with those who have been sucked into 'reels,' as though into a quagmire.

"We know about youngsters' desire for 'exploits.' I have in mind their tremendous craving for self-expression; they want to test themselves, and it must be in extreme situations. Therefore, we have set the objective of establishing a military-patriotic club in every rayon of the city. We have enlisted soldiers in the reserves, students at military academies, and soldiers who have performed their internationalist duty to work with us. We are looking for enthusiasts who will get involved in this undertaking. Sergey Fedorov has set up a Sparta Club, and Vladimir Shchukin has organized Krepysh. That is only a beginning. The age-old problem is facilities. But recently members of the commission on young people's affairs raised this question in principle at a session of the city soviet. We have no end of youngsters who want to

join young airborne assault troops' clubs. But once again, we cannot satisfy the desire of all of them. There is not enough equipment and gear, and there are no uniforms. The oblast and city committees of the All-Union Voluntary Society for Promotion of the Army, Aviation and Navy are not helping us as they ought to be.

"I believe that it is time for us to finally engage in shaping public opinion concerning teenage crime. Is it only the Komsomol, the schools and the militia that should "fight" for purity of morals? In one rayon the parents themselves of teenagers have undertaken to establish volunteer militia aides' units at places of residence—they go out on patrol every evening. We are now helping with the establishment of such formations."

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## Planners Force Moscow Advocates to Demand Pay For Services

18000276a Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Mar 88p 2

[Article by G. Tumasov, advocate: "Barber, Tailor, and ..... Attorney:Legal Services To Have the Same Status as Domestic Services — Does This Make Sense?"]

[Text] Not long ago, for the first time in the history of the Soviet legal profession, attorneys' cooperatives were included under the rubric of provision of domestic services to the population, along with public baths, barber shops, shoemakers, and the like.

It is completely obvious that the work of attorneys has nothing in common with domestic services and that this is a violation of article 161 of the USSR Constitution, which clearly defines not only the place of the legal profession in the Soviet social system, but also its function — to provide legal aid to citizens and organizations, and to protect their rights and lawful interests.

What has occasioned this far-fetched and unexpected inclusion of the legal profession in the list of enterprises and organizations providing citizens with domestic services? Apparently, an acute need for a flow of monetary receipts in return for remunerated services.

And thus, arbitrarily replacing the constitutional concept of "legal aid" with the term "remunerated services," the planning organs (in order to make up for the deficit in consumer amenities) are "passing down" a plan for monetary receipts to the attorneys' collectives. It is clear that it has never entered the head of these financial experts that the money paid for attorneys' services constitutes their wage fund and is the funding source used to meet the necessary expenses of a collective's activities. The attorneys' collectives simply do not have the profits that plans call for taxing to replenish the coffers of the state budget.

The cooperatives of Soviet attorneys are associations of individuals, operating in accordance with principles of self-financing and self-payback; the money received from citizens and organizations in exchange for legal services are used to contribute to social security funds, and to pay for leave time; this money is used by the collectives to maintain technical personnel and to fully meet their own organizational and administrative needs. In addition, the collectives' funds are used to provide compensation for work by attorneys that, in accordance with the requirments of article 11 of the Law concerning the Soviet legal profession, must be provided free of charge, particularly, consultations on labor issues.

Thus, since it frees the state from the expenses involved in implementing the constitutional guarantee of important civil rights without receiving any compensation from the state in return, the legal profession isindependent and has the right to make its own plan for monetary receipts and to set its own income and expenditure targets. Such matters are within the purview of the collectives' general meeting.

The planning organs' encroachment upon the collectives' financial activities not only contradicts legislation dealing with the legal profession, but also is devoid of common sense.

Nonetheless, "top-down" planning continues to pick up speed. The plan for monetary receipts from the population for the Moscow oblast attorneys' collective increased from 1,660,000 rubles in 1986 to 2,150,000 in 1987. It is not surprising that this plan "handed down from above" was greatly beyond the collective's actual capacity to pay and was not fulfilled. But, in spite of the sharp decrease in criminal cases (which in past years have provided the greater part of monetary recipts), the planning organs have required that in 1988 the collective extract 2,551,000 rubles from the public at any cost!

Speaking frankly, the news of this fantastic figure, born in the bowels of the inscrutable oblast planning organ, has put our collective in a state of shock. Why, in order to fulfill this "state order" each attorney in the collective, working for himself and for his comrades who cannot work because of illness or pregnancy, birth, and child care (and our collective is 41 percent female) must obtain from the citizenry no less than 500 rubles (!) per month.

If one takes into consideration the fact that the state has set an upper limit on the size of fees charged by attorneys, then this plan can only be fulfilled by doubling or tripling our workloads. But since when has provision of legal aid ceased to be work which is responsible and requires special attention? Any error made by an attorney, the slightest carelessness or thoughtlessness may gravely affect a person's fate, causing damage to his legitimate interests. Of course, every citizen who seeks legal services should have the right to expect that they not be provided to him at a tempo characteristic of

assembly line production. However, this is precisely the style of work imposed on the legal profession by the short-sighted ideas of the authors of the plan directives.

No, we do not want attorneys to be transformed from specialists with a higher education, committed to defending workers against violations of their rights and legitimate interests, into a collection of "reluctant money grubbers," for whom fulfilling the plan on extracting money from the population has overshadowed their main professional function.

By forcing attorneys to give first priority to "remunerated services", the planning organs are assigning a secondary role to providing legal services to eneterprises. Indeed, how in the world is an attorney going to find the time to provide high-quality services to enterprises?

Another very important responsibility of attorneys is also likely to be neglected in the midst of their financial concerns. This is active participation in propaganda in favor of the law and to prevent lawbreaking. It is no accident that during the last year, the attorneys of this oblast showed a significant decline in parameters reflecting mass education activities. While in 1986 11,370 lectures and discussions on legal topics were held, in 1987 the number of such events had decreased to 8,621. It is not difficult to understand that in such a situation the idea of universal legal education is nipped in the bud.

The helpless position of the USSR and RSFSR Ministries of Justice is a cause for serious concern. Acknowledging the harm done to the work of attorneys by financial pressure, they, alas, have been unable to protect the collectives from administrative interference on the part of those who, evidently, have only a remote understanding of our work. Even the RSFSR Ministry of Justice has begun to issue conciliatory demands to "meet the plan for services to the population."

And it seems very curious that attorneys' fulfillment of these "plans" is being overseen by the divisions of consumer and domestic services and trade of the oblast's authoritative organs. How does this relate to the area of jurisprudence? It's incomprehensible!

It is obvious that the solution to the problems posed by the party with regard to providing the citizenry with essential services should involve actual expansion of a variety of domestic services, improvement of transport, commerce, repair and maintenance services, and building of stores and cafes. We cannot simply resort to window-dressing in the area of domestic services and compensate for organizational impotence by attaching the monetary receipts paid in exchange for legal services.

## Finance Ministry Chief Examines Law on Official Business Trips

18000276b Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Mar 88p 3

[Article by R. Ignatyev: "Business Trip Without Advance Report"]

[Text] On 1 April 1988 a new USSR Council of Ministers' resolution, "On official business trips within the USSR," goes into effect. Certain statutes of this normative act have already been discussed in the press. We asked V. Shirnyuk, division chief of the USSR Finance Ministry to discuss certain points in this new document.

First of all I would like to note, said Vadim Timofeyevich, that the resolution is directed at an extension of the rights of administrators of associations, enterprises, institutions, and organizations. Naturally, it cannot provide an answer to all the relevant questions. For this reason as a supplement, we are developing a regulation on official business trips within the USSR. Work on this regulation is essentially complete. In the near future all ministries and departments of the country will be able to obtain it.

[Question] What additional information will this regulation contain?

[Answer] For example, in order to simplify documentation associated with official travel, we will introduce a completely new type of official travel authorization. We have included the altered document in the regulation. By the way, it will essentially replace the travel order, since we will now no longer require an administrator to issue a special written order. The new forms will not be available immediately and will be delayed so for the time being the old ones may be used.

[Question] The resolution says that the ceilings on expenditure for a official business trips will be abolished. Please explain this provision.

[Answer] Today, when associations, enterprises, organizations, and institutions are undergoing the transition to self financing and self payback, it was decided to abolish these ceilings. After all the new methods of management require organizations to save every kopeck. The administration itself will determine the duration of the trip up to a maximum of 40 days. In addition, in cases where the amount of expenses is known in advance, the administrator will be permitted to give the traveller the money without the latter having to submit supporting documents later. In other words, when he returns the traveller will not have to render accounts to the accounts department. This will save time and money.

[Question] But isn't it possible that the sum provided might turn out to be too small, compelling the traveller to spend his own money? [Answer] Then he must submit documents which will be used to reimburse him. The same principle will be used to reimburse those who, with the administration's permission, have used first class trains, cabins on sea-going vessels with group I-IV tariff rates, or cabins of category I and II on river vessels, and also first class tickets on aircraft.

[Question] But nevertheless the new regulations still contain so-called "loop-holes." For example, one can reach cities relatively close to Moscow (Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk) in one night by train, although one has been given money for a plane ticket. The difference in the cost of tickets is substantial...

[Answer] If the dates for the trip are observed, then it would be difficult to make a claim of misconduct here. In such situations, the manager himself must decide what mode of transportation is best and trust his workers. The size of the travel allowance for trips has been increased. While previously the perdiem allowance was 2 rubles 3 kopecks, now it is 3 rubles 50 kopecks. And in regions of the Far North and similar areas, and also in Maritime Kray and Amur Oblast, a traveller is given 4 rubles and 50 kopecks for each day of the trip.

Expenses for lodging will now be reimbursed at up to 5 rubles a day in cities like Moscow, Leningrad, and in the capitals of the union republics. In other cities and rayon centers, the allotment will be 4 rubles. And in other inhabited areas it will be 3 rubles. The sum reimbursed for travel to the trip destination and back by air, rail, sea, river, or intercity motor transport will include insurance charges and fees for advance purchase of tickets.

[Question] Will these regulations apply to all associations, organizations, institutions, and enterprises?

[Answer] No, the ceiling on expenditure for official travel for workers in administrative organs, and also institutions, and organizations stipulated in the budget will be established by the minstries and departments of the USSR, and the Council of Ministers of the union republics. Trips by workers, managers, and specialists sent to do construction, installation, and alignment and adjustment work, must not exceed one year. In special cases, trips of longer duration may be ordered by the heads of the ministries and departments of the country, and the Council of Ministers of the union republics. After two months on travel, instead of the perdiem, construction, installation and alignment and adjustment workers will have a bonus of 50 percent of the wage rate added to their salary, but the sum must not exceed the established standards. All expenses are reimbursed when the appropriate documents are submitted. The previous official travel procedures are retained for workers in the higher organs of government and economic management. The duration of such travel is up to 5 days.

#### 'Operative-Preventive Groups' Formed in Georgia To Combat Crime

18300259 [Editorial Report] Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian on 24 March 1988 carries on page 4 an 800-word GRUZINFORM report outlining a new Georgian MVD initiative to combat the growing number of crimes against individuals. In a statement to a GRUZIN-FORM correspondent, Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs Sh.V. Gorgodze explained that "Operative-preventive groups are being formed in cities and towns with the participation of the militia, voluntary peoples' patrol members [narodniye druzhinniki], Komsomol members, and representatives of factories and organizations." The groups will be particularly concerned with "people not engaged in useful labor," whom they will help to find jobs. In addition, measures will be taken by transport authorities to expose those violating passport regulations, tramps [brodyagi], beggars [poproshayki], drug abusers, and narcotics speculators.

#### Estonian-Russian Relations, Radical Reform Proposal Coverage Criticized

18000374 [Editorial Report] Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian on 3 May 1988 carries on page 3 a 700-word unattributed article entitled "No One Was Indifferent." The article describes a meeting of 68 people with the editorial staff of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA on 4 May. The meeting was organized by the Gorkiy library Russian subscriptions staff, who had previously polled readers on their opinions of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA's coverage of problems of concern to the Russian-speaking population of the republic. Present at the meeting to answer readers' questions were: E. Kekelidze, member of the editorial staff and head of the literature and art department; V. Ivanov, head of the propaganda department; S. Stavitskaya, who is responsible for issuing the press-service "Kontakt;" and A. Podvezko of the propaganda staff.

Many readers said that "the information in Russianlanguage papers about the existing situation in the republic did not meet the needs and interests of the people. They persistently asked: why did SOVETSKAYA ESTO-NIYA shed such meagre light on the proceedings of the joint plenum of creative unions of the republic and not publish the ducuments adopted at the meeting? The readers were not satisfied with the explanation given by the Estonian CP CC, that the republic party papers should not publish documents which reflect positions not fully supported by the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party. It was persistently stressed that passing over events in silence has caused more harm than the publication of disputable documents, and that in the era of glasnost all segments of the population, regardless of their language or party membership, have a right to first-hand information."

The most pointed and painful questions, the article notes, concerned the problems of national relations and bilingualism.

"It was noted that recently these relations had become strained, that some segments of the Estonian and non-Estonian populations do not try to understand the objective causes that give rise to certain phenomena; attention is focused only on mutual grievances. Many of our readers had the impression that the republic's creative intelligentsia appearing at the plenum did not take into account the interests of the Russian-speaking population of the republic, insultingly ignoring the fact that part of the non-Estonian population is native and is truly interested in solving those problems which are disturbing to the Estonian population today."

The readers "noted with bitterness" that Estonian newspapers, radio and television rarely engage their Russianspeaking partners in dialogue, and therefore social opinion is formed one-sidedly.

# Numbers of Students, Physicians Listed by Republic

18300262 [Editorial Report] Tashkent KOMMUNIST UZBEKISTANA in Russian No 4, April 1988 carries on pages 50-57 a 3400-word article by K. Buranov, doctor of philosophical sciences, entitled "Socialism and Balancing the Levels of National Cultural Development" in which he lists 1984-85 statistics on the numbers of students and physicians in the USSR, broken down by republic. During the 1984-85 school year, for every 10,000 people, there were from 163 to 213 students in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Latvia, and Armenia, while there were only from 122 to 161 in Uzbekistan, Moldavia, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Estonia. While the USSR as a whole averages 41.2 physicians per 10,000 members of the population, in Estonia there are 45.5, in Latvia 48, in Georgia 52.5, in Tajikistan 26, in Turkmenia 31.1, in Kirghizia 32.4, in Uzbekistan 32.7, and in Moldavia and Kazakhstan 36.3 each.

## Latvian Military Unit Commander Expelled From Party

18000385 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 7 May 88 p 3

[LATINFORM report: "Incompatible With Party Membership"]

[Text] As was already reported, the 5 May 88 Latvian CP Central Committee Plenum expelled party member A.T. Chmykhalov from the ranks of the party for discrediting the name of CPSU member.

While commanding a military unit, A.T. Chmykhalov abused his official position and permitted breaches of party discipline and the ethical norms of a leader and communist. He personally, and through his subordinate officer-communists, grossly violated regulations on housing assignments, financial and personal discipline and lead an amoral lifestyle. The military procuracy has instituted criminal proceedings against A.T. Chmykhalov.

Having examined the personal matter of A.T. Chmykhalov, the primary party organization, the military unit administration and the unit's party commission, guided by Paragraph 11 of the CPSU Rules, submitted the recommendation to the Latvian CP Central Committee Plenum to expell A.T. Chmykhaylov from the ranks of the party.

#### Latvian Informal Groups Gain Independence, Meet More Frequently

18000364 [Editorial Report] Moscow LITERATUR-NAYA GAZETA in Russian on 11 May 1988 carries on page 4 a 500-word article entitled "Meetings - An Everyday Occurrence..." which opens with the statement: "Only a short half year ago the Riga city authorities could in no way bring themselves to give permission to informal groups from the environmental protection club to gather for a meeting. Then, finally, they decided to 'risk' it, and now, in a matter of only one week, three genuine meetings have already taken place: one to commemorate the tragedy of Chernobyl, one against the construction of the subway in Riga, and one demanding that the Slokskiy Paper and Pulp Plant, the main poisoner of Yurmala, be closed."

The article goes on to describe the recent gathering of thousands of Riga residents at Arkadiya Park to protest the Riga subway construction. Latvians are concerned that the subway will damage the old city, encourage the influx of the "limitchiki" [norm workers], otherwise referred to as "migrants," and lead to the aggravation of the housing problem and the demographic situation.

The city leaders were merely observers at this meeting, and did not step up to the podium to defend their views, and to prove the need for the subway. The author states that he realized that no other point of view would have been listened to by the crowd, and remembers how different points of view were treated only yesterday, wondering if the present "champions of democracy" have now adopted that same method.

The author draws the conclusion that these meetings prove that the people have awakened from their sleep and overcome apathy; that social activism of citizens is growing day by day; that the people have proven to be the model of orderliness on their own, even without the services of the militia; and that there is goodwill toward cooperation, not only on the part of the authorities, but on the part of the people as well. He notes that this was the first time the informal groups insisted on meeting at a place different from the one proposed by the authorities.

#### Public Transport 'Strike' in Lithuanian Port City

18000384 [Editorial Report] Moscow SOTSIALISTI-CHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian on 21 May 1988 carried on page 2 a 400-word article by R. Motskus, reporting that on 18 May, in the city of Klaypeda, there was no bus service for 24 hours. Lithuania's Chairman of the Council of Ministers V. Sakalauskas and Lithuanian CP Central Committee Secretary A.M. Brazauskas went/ to Klaypeda to find out the reasons for the 'strike,' among which was listed "the scandalous inability of managers of the bus yard and public organizations to work with people." It was further explained that the bus drivers decided to strike after the enterprise management refused to pay them part of their bonus awards for April because the city buses had not fulfilled the profit plan for passenger transport. The workers lost 18-70 rubles of their monthly pay. Other complaints included shortcomings in labor organization, negligence in the operation of the machines and in passenger service, and unsolved routine problems. The management of the bus yard finally resolved the strike by promising to pay the workers the difference in salary, to work out fairer salary norms and to attack the remianing unresolved problems. The drivers went back to work the next day.

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